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1. Anne O. Krueger
IMF Stabilization Programs
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) was established after the Second
World War at Bretton Woods (along with the International Bank for Re-
construction and Development, now referred to as the World Bank) as a
multilateral institution to coordinate exchange rate arrangements among
nations. The immediate concerns of the original IMF architects focused on
avoiding the competitive devaluations of the 1930s, while at the same time
encouraging liberalization of the world trading system.1 It was anticipated
that there would be a worldwide system of “fixed, but adjustable” exchange
rates, with adjustments coming only when there was “fundamental disequi-
librium.”2 In normal times, it was thought that there might be temporary fi-
nancing problems for countries that could maintain their fixed exchange
rates with the help of the IMF.
The preeminence of the American economy and the accompanying “dol-
The author is indebted to Jose Antonio Gonzalez, Nicholas Hope, Michael Michaely, T. N.
Srinivasan, Jungho Yoo, and participants in the NBER Woodstock conference for helpful
comments on the earlier draft of this paper, and to Marco Sorge for research assistance.
1. It was intended that there be an International Trade Organization (ITO) along with the
IMF and World Bank. The ITO was to oversee trading arrangements. However, the ITO never
came into being; instead of an international organization, the General Agreement on Tariﬀs
and Trade (GATT) came into being by executive degree, and there was no international or-
ganization until the World Trade Organization (which incorporated the GATT) in 1995. For a
brief history of the founding of the Bretton Woods institutions, see Krueger (1999).
2. The concept of “fundamental disequilibrium” was never well defined. In practice, most
IMF stabilization programs have included an exchange rate adjustment.
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lar shortage” in the international economy immediately after the Second
World War was not anticipated, and there emerged a de facto (“fixed but
adjustable”) dollar standard, although the dollar itself was pegged to gold.
The IMF functioned much as expected in occasional balance-of-payments
crises among developed countries, such as the pound devaluations of 19493
and 1967 and the German appreciation of 1960. However, most Fund activ-
ity was with developing countries even in its initial decades, as the strength
and resources of the American economy dwarfed those of the Fund, while
the perceived needs for reconstruction support (which came in large part
from the Marshall Plan) had been greatly underestimated.
Among the developing countries, balance-of-payments diﬃculties were
suﬃciently frequent that the Fund quickly came to be involved in several of
these crises annually. During the 1950s and 1960s, the Fund dealt occasion-
ally with developed countries’ exchange rate or payments diﬃculties, but
the bulk of its activities consisted of “stabilization programs” for develop-
ing countries.4
By 1973, the “Bretton Woods” system of fixed, but adjustable, exchange
rates was abandoned, and the major developed countries adopted floating
exchange rates.5 With that, IMF stabilization programs became centered al-
most entirely on individual developing countries. The basic content of these
programs remained much the same over the years, and this is discussed first
in section 4.1.1. A key feature of the international financial system, as it in-
teracted with these crises and subsequent programs, was that the trigger for
a crisis usually took the form of an inability to continue servicing debt vol-
untarily. Most of that debt was either short-term trade credits or owed to
oﬃcial creditors.
With the 1980s, the first major change in Fund stabilization programs
took place. By that time, some of the countries confronting crises had very
large volumes of debt, both short and long term, outstanding to private
creditors. The Fund’s resources were often small relative to the size of out-
standing private indebtedness, and it changed the nature of the way in which
the Fund could support countries in crisis. Throughout the 1980s, most of
these countries still maintained fairly severe and stringent capital controls,
and many maintained quantitative restrictions on imports.6
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3. The French, however, undertook an early devaluation and notified the IMF only after
they had done so.
4. See Sturc (1968) for a description and analysis of early Fund stabilization programs.
5. Among the industrial countries, Canada had earlier adopted a floating exchange rate, and
the United States had cut its tie to gold in 1971.
6. Many African countries were hard-hit by the debt crisis of the 1980s. Longer-term IMF
programs (Extended Structural Adjustment Facilities) were established to support them.
These programs diﬀered in a number of ways from the programs discussed here, but their as-
sessment would entail consideration of a number of diﬀerent issues from those relevant to the
Asian and other twin crises. At any event, the executive directors of the IMF voted in Septem-
ber 2000 to abolish these longer-term arrangements.
By the 1990s, however, some of the rapidly growing developing countries
had greatly liberalized their trade regimes and opened their capital ac-
counts to a considerable extent. In some instances, when crises arose, do-
mestic financial systems were severely aﬀected in ways that will be examined
later. This changed both the time frame in which crises could erupt and be
addressed and the nature of the impact of crises on the domestic economy.
Although Mexico confronted a balance-of-payments-cum-financial cri-
sis (twin crisis) late in 1994, most observers of the world economy were
alerted to these new-style twin crises with the Asian financial crises of 1997–
98. The magnitude of the crises and the severity of the impact on the crisis-
aﬄicted countries led many to question the role of the IMF both in failing
to anticipate and prevent the diﬃculties and in overseeing programs in-
tended to address the crisis situations.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the role of the IMF in the 1990s
twin crises. Focus is on stabilization aspects of the program: Goldstein
(2001) considers the extent to which these programs addressed areas other
than those that were aimed at restoring viable financial and balance-of-
payments situations, and those issues are not covered here. The starting
point is with the more traditional IMF stabilization programs of the 1960s
and 1970s. That is the subject of section 4.1.1. In section 4.1.2, the analysis
is extended to cover situations in which balance-of-payments crises are ac-
companied by financial crises. A third section then considers the sorts of
programs that must be developed when the financial and exchange rate
crises occur simultaneously.
On the basis of that analysis, two of the IMF programs eﬀected in the
Asian crisis—Korea’s and Indonesia’s—will be examined in section 4.1.4.
Section 4.1.5 then draws on the experience under these programs and con-
trasts them with the behavior of some other crisis countries and countries
not subject to crisis.
4.1.1 Traditional Stabilization Programs
Consider a small open economy, initially in equilibrium at a fixed ex-
change rate, that experiences domestic inflation at a rate more rapid than is
occurring in the rest of the world. As the demand for foreign goods grows
more rapidly than the supply of foreign exchange,7 there are several policy
options. There is excess demand for foreign goods, so that the country ini-
tially incurs a current account deficit not oﬀset by long-term capital in-
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7. It is possible, of course, that favorable shifts in the terms of trade could oﬀset the appre-
ciation of the real exchange rate. However, this would be coincidence, and it is assumed here
that there is no such oﬀset. Without domestic inflation, the same excess demand for foreign ex-
change is likely to diminish as the demand for foreign exchange increases with an appreciating
real exchange rate, because domestic demand for relatively cheaper exportables rises while the
profitability of producing them falls.
flows.8 In that event, the current account deficit can be financed in the short
run by running down foreign exchange reserves or by borrowing from
abroad. However, unless something else (such as the rate of inflation)
changes, the deficit is unsustainable and some form of adjustment will be
forced.
There are two alternatives if a fixed nominal exchange rate is to be main-
tained. A first is to let domestic monetary and fiscal policy be suﬃciently de-
flationary so that domestic prices fall relative to those in the rest of the
world (or fail to rise as rapidly as prices are rising in the rest of the world)
or domestic incomes fall (and hence the domestic demand for foreign goods
shifts downward while the domestic supply of exportables increases). The
second alternative is to impose exchange controls, rationing the available
foreign exchange through quantitative means across various demanders,
and attempting to restrict foreign exchange usage to the available supply of
foreign exchange. This can be achieved, at least to some degree, although
over time private agents discover a number of ways in which to evade the
regime.9
In the 1950s and 1960s, many developing countries chose to use quanti-
tative restrictions (QRs) to keep their current account deficits from becom-
ing larger than could be financed. These QRs were permitted on “balance
of payments” grounds under General Agreement on Tariﬀs and Trade
(GATT) rules. However, the costs of these QRs mounted over time, as ex-
port earnings failed to grow as rapidly as real gross domestic product
(GDP; the real exchange rate was appreciating because the domestic infla-
tion rate was greater than that in the rest of the world), while it was in-
creasingly diﬃcult to contain the growing excess demand for imports.
Even in the world of the 1950s and 1960s, a “crisis” eventually took
place.10 In some countries, the crisis was triggered when the lack of imports
began severely restricting economic activity. This was the case in Turkey, for
example, in 1958 when the crops (which were a major source of export earn-
ings) could not be harvested: for lack of petroleum imports, farmers were
unable to use farm machinery to harvest crops or to transport them to
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8. More generally, the current account deficit simply needs to exceed the volume of volun-
tary net capital inflows. Hence, if a country is a recipient of some foreign direct investment
(FDI; or foreign aid, or portfolio investment) and no other capital inflows, the relevant
“deficit” is the current account balance less the net FDI (or other voluntary flows). However,
it simplifies the exposition to assume no voluntary capital flows so that the entire current ac-
count deficit somehow must be financed.
9. As excess demand for foreign exchange builds up under a fixed nominal exchange rate and
exchange control, various forms of evasion spring up. These illegal flows (smuggling, false in-
voicing, etc.) generally result in large “errors and omissions” items in the balance-of-payments
statistics of countries attempting to contain excess demand for foreign exchange as the real ex-
change rate appreciates to more and more unrealistic levels. One of the extreme instances was
in Ghana in the early 1980s, when the black market exchange rate reached a level more than
900 percent above the oﬃcial exchange rate.
10. For a good documentary history of the IMF, see James (1996).
ports.11 In other instances, the unavailability of suﬃcient foreign exchange
to maintain voluntary debt service signaled the onset of the crisis. This was
the more frequent trigger for change in regime in some Latin American
countries where accelerating inflation at a fixed (or insuﬃciently adjusted)
nominal exchange rate led to rapidly rising demand for foreign goods and
services, which the authorities attempted to satisfy (in an eﬀort to reduce in-
flationary pressures) until financing sources dried up. Excess demand for
foreign exchange—usually expansionary fiscal and monetary policy—also
led to accelerating inflation, which finally reached unacceptable levels. In
these circumstances, real exchange rates had appreciated greatly by the time
the crisis point was reached.
Regardless of the triggering mechanism, the underlying problems were
similar in origin: excess demand for goods and services had resulted from
fiscal deficits and expansionary monetary policy. At the point when the
authorities deemed the situations suﬃciently severe to warrant action12
and approached the IMF, the usual situation was that current account ex-
penditures exceeded current account revenues by a considerable margin
(often with a large errors and omissions item in the balance of payments,
as well, reflecting unrecorded outflows), the real exchange rate had appre-
ciated substantially relative to other countries, the rate of inflation was un-
acceptably high, and all of these had been driven in large part by fiscal
deficits. In many instances, there were capital outflows occurring through
such mechanisms as underinvoicing of exports, overinvoicing of imports,
inflated tourist expenses, and overstated factor payments abroad. Simul-
taneously, in anticipation of an exchange rate change, importers were at-
tempting to accelerate imports and build up inventories, exporters were
delaying exports, and so on. Despite capital controls, the number of de-
vices people could find with which to speculate against a currency was re-
markable.13
When the IMF was approached for support, the usual situation was one
in which the problems mentioned above had to be addressed, and, in addi-
tion, the lack of imports was itself fueling inflation and restricting produc-
tion. The term “stabilization” came about because these economies at times
of balance-of-payments crisis were thought of as spiraling out of control,
with inflation rising, eﬀorts at capital flight intensifying, and debt-servicing
diﬃculties mounting at increasing rates.14 The essential IMF stabilization
program, therefore, usually consisted of an agreed-upon set of ceilings on
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11. By 1958, Turkey had accumulated considerable short-term debt in the form of suppliers’
credits and could not obtain even trade financing for imports. Hence, the inability to borrow
further (and creditors’ demands for repayments) was the proximate cause of the diﬃculty.
12. Defining a crisis is diﬃcult. One country’s crisis is another country’s everyday occur-
rence. See Little, Cooper, Corden, and Rajapatirana (1993) for a discussion.
13. It was even reported that the London Times carried advertisements oﬀering to over-
invoice shipments to countries with exchange control and stating its percentage fee.
14. See Sturc (1968) for a description and analysis of some early Fund stabilization programs.
fiscal deficits and domestic credit creation,15 and a change to a new, fixed,
nominal exchange rate.16
The altered exchange rate very often immediately reversed the speculative
capital outflow, so that the recorded balance-of-payments position could
improve very quickly. The fiscal and monetary tightening associated with
the fiscal and domestic credit ceilings usually resulted in a slowdown in the
rate of economic activity and in the rate of inflation, which in turn reduced
the excess demand for imports and freed up the supply of exports. All of
these measures then served to generate balance-of-payments improvement.
Whether the improvement was long-lasting depended on a number of fac-
tors, chief among which was whether the key sources of inflationary pres-
sure and excess demand had been satisfactorily addressed.17
For future reference, it is worth pointing out that, in some instances, IMF
programs even in the 1950s and 1960s often imposed conditions on govern-
mental behavior. In some cases, price controls on state economic enter-
prises (SEEs) insured that those SEEs would incur losses, which in turn
were financed by loans from the central bank. In cases in which these SEE
deficits were important and increasing, it was recognized that there could
be no reduction in the pressures of excess demand unless the underlying
problem—the controls on prices that led to SEE losses and central bank
credit creation—were removed. The same sort of conditions applied on oc-
casion when particular subsidies—such as that for Egyptian grain18—were
so large that fiscal balance could not be achieved without reducing them. In
the Dominican Republic in the early 1980s, the state-owned electric com-
pany was incurring a deficit equal to 11 percent of GDP! In that circum-
stance, it was evident that a major source of the fiscal deficit and inflation-
ary pressure could not be removed until the underlying financial position of
the electric company was addressed.
In addition to the circumstances in which changing a domestic policy was
essential if the underlying factors that had led to crisis were not immediately
to recur, there were cases in which a highly ineﬃcient governmental policy
could be replaced with a more rational one: such was the case with the Turk-
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15. The independent ceiling on credit creation apparently was first initiated when IMF staﬀ
thought that there were oﬀ-budget expenditures being substituted for governmental expendi-
tures.
16. For an assessment of IMF programs as of the late 1970s, before debts to private credi-
tors had become important, see Cline and Weintraub (1981). Even at that time, there was con-
siderable criticism of Fund stabilization programs. For some examples, see Williamson (1983).
17. See Edwards (1989) and Krueger (1978) for analyses of the paths of inflation, the real ex-
change rate, and current account balances after devaluations. It was not always true that eco-
nomic contraction followed a fiscal or monetary tightening. Trade liberalization often permit-
ted an expansion in the rate of economic activity. In Turkey in 1958, for example, real GDP
expanded by 5 percent after the deflationary program of August 1958 was put into eﬀect.
18. In the case of Egyptian grains, these were sold so cheaply in the domestic market that
farmers found it profitable to feed bread to their chickens. Fund insistence on their reduction
was followed by street riots, which led to a reimposition of the grain subsidies.
ish devaluation of 1958, after which the earlier chaotic trade regime under
which everyone queued for unpredictable lengths of time for import licenses
was replaced by a system in which designated imports were granted licenses
virtually automatically, whereas other imports were subject to licensing
through which maximums were set as to the quantity that would be permit-
ted to be imported.
Usually, by the time the IMF was approached, countries had run down
their foreign exchange reserves to very low levels and were incurring or had
incurred considerable debts as they attempted to maintain imports and eco-
nomic growth in the face of an increasingly overvalued exchange rate and
worsening balance-of-payments position. Moreover, as already mentioned,
imports had sometimes been greatly suppressed prior to the inauguration
of the IMF program. For either or both of these reasons, governments typ-
ically sought debt rescheduling and IMF financing. Debt rescheduling
spread out the overhang of debt to a more feasible repayment schedule.
Typically, oﬃcial debt (which was often the major portion of long-term fi-
nancing) was rescheduled through a meeting of oﬃcial creditors organized
by the IMF but de jure carried out under the auspices of the French Trea-
sury, and known as the Paris Club. Private debts—usually short-term cred-
its from commercial banks—were rescheduled at a meeting of private cred-
itors usually held in London and known as the London Club.
Often, countries’ import flows had been severely restricted or reduced
immediately preceding the crisis, while foreign exchange earnings had fallen
sharply. In order to “restart” the economy, it was not suﬃcient to resched-
ule debt: new money was needed, and IMF financing was extended.19 In
many cases, IMF financing was supplemented by oﬃcial credits from the
World Bank and bilateral donors. This financing, at a minimum, enabled an
inflow of imports which itself was deflationary and often also permitted a
reduction in the restrictiveness of the QR regime for imports.
The mechanism by which the IMF program was adopted was straight-
forward. Once it was deemed that a proposed program was satisfactory, the
head of government would sign a letter of intent (LOI) to the managing di-
rector of the IMF, requesting IMF financing and laying forth the govern-
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19. Under the Articles of Agreement of the IMF, countries are entitled to draw down a cer-
tain amount from the IMF automatically. The more they have drawn down, the stricter are the
criteria for drawing down further tranches. In most instances, countries embarking upon sta-
bilization programs had already drawn down a considerable amount and were seeking higher
tranches of lending. The Fund did not provide all financing at once; stabilization programs
were usually for two years, and a typical program set six-month targets. At the end of each six-
month period, fund staﬀ reviewed performance under the program, and a next tranche was re-
leased when performance was deemed adequate. Evaluating performance was in some regards
problematic: when countries fell short of some targets, issues arose as to whether the shortfall
was the result of circumstances unforeseen at the time of the program negotiation and whether
the shortfall was serious enough to warrant suspension of the program. There were frequent
program suspensions, but also frequent compromises, and many instances in which govern-
ments simply did not abide by the terms of the program.
ment’s plans as to the key macroeconomic indicators. Almost always, it was
agreed that there would be a change in the nominal exchange rate, or in the
exchange rate regime, as part of the program. Likewise, ceilings on fiscal
deficits and domestic credit were almost always included. Proposed changes
in other key parameters (such as the subsidy rate for Egyptian grain or the
pricing of Dominican electricity) were also spelled out.
In some cases, the program had already been adopted in the borrowing
country. This was the case in Turkey in 1980, for example, when the domes-
tic authorities undertook sweeping reforms (which went far beyond what the
Fund would have required in order to extend financial support) and then ap-
proached the Fund for a loan. In other cases, the program was devised jointly
by IMF staﬀ and government oﬃcials.20 Often, this was because policymak-
ers in the would-be borrower country were reluctant to alter policies; how-
ever, in the absence of any alteration, it was clear that Fund support would
do no more than provide temporary breathing space and only postpone the
onset of a similar crisis. And it is self-evident that it would do a disservice
to a country to lend in support of a futile program: the outcome would be a
renewed crisis at a later date, with more debt having accumulated because
of the first program. However, since a program in most instances increased
the probability that economic performance would improve, some programs
were no doubt undertaken where chances of success were very limited.
The “joint” determination of the program was really an outcome of a ne-
gotiating eﬀort between IMF oﬃcials and representatives of the govern-
ment. Devising any stabilization program inevitably entailed judgment.
Macroeconomic outcomes are uncertain: unforeseen or unpredictable fu-
ture events (such as the prices of key exportable commodities or the
weather), unpredictable or unanticipated (in terms of timing as well as of
magnitude) responses of consumers and producers to altered relative
prices, serious strikes, and changes in the government can all aﬀect the
speed of response. A “stronger” program carries a higher probability of suc-
cess, but even a weak program could succeed with good fortune in terms of
weather, external terms of trade changes, and appropriate changes in ex-
pectations and consumer and producer behavior.21
Moreover, a strong program is likely to entail more short-run adjustment
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20. It is often forgotten that, in most developing countries especially in the 1950s and 1960s,
the pool of available talent in key government ministries was very thin. Quite aside from the
lessons of experience and changed economic thinking, one reason why developing countries’
economic policies have been gradually becoming less inchoate over time has been the in-
creased quality and breadth of able civil servants and policymakers.
21. It is probably true that consumer and producer responses are weaker and slower in coun-
tries where there is a history of past failed attempted stabilization programs. Since that variable
is diﬀerent for each country, to the extent that past history matters, it is clear that there is no “one
size fits all” model of how much adjustment in the key variables is warranted. Moreover, since
the outcome is in any event probabilistic, a key question concerns the probability of success that
IMF and government oﬃcials should accept for programs, bearing in mind that “stronger” pro-
grams (with larger exchange rate changes and sharper tightening of monetary and fiscal poli-
cies) probably bring larger adjustment costs to politically vocal sections of society.
costs.22 A cut of x percent in the fiscal deficit entails a larger increase in tax
receipts or a greater reduction in government expenditures than a smaller
percentage cut. Likewise, a larger increase in tariﬀs for electricity, bus fares,
or other governmental services imposes more of a hardship on users than
does a smaller increase.
Hence, there is reason to adopt no stronger a program than is deemed
warranted in order to stabilize the economy and provide a suﬃciently high
probability that growth can be resumed. However, the fact that larger
macroeconomic policy changes may impose hardships on particular groups
in the economy is often used to oppose any changes at all. Hardships en-
dured after the start of a Fund program are generally blamed on the pro-
gram, without regard to the counterfactual trajectory of economic vari-
ables that would have occurred had there been no Fund program and the
economy continued its downward spiral. Space does not permit a review of
the evidence in this regard, but it is increasingly apparent that the very
groups that are alleged to be most harmed by IMF stabilization programs
are the groups that are most harmed by the unstable macroeconomic envi-
ronment (especially inflation) that is generally the alternative.
However, in most instances, it could be expected that Fund programs
with any credibility whatsoever would be followed by short-term increases
in foreign exchange receipts and reductions in demand for foreign ex-
change. This is because these programs were usually adopted at a time when
speculation against the currency had occurred and, with it, speculative
withholding of exports, speculative prepayment of imports, and capital
flight through whatever means were available. Thus, in the period immedi-
ately following the announcement of a Fund program and an associated
devaluation, the foreign exchange situation could be expected to improve
(both because of the reversal of speculative outflows anticipating the deval-
uation and because the receipt of Fund resources provided assurance in
most instances that further exchange rate changes would not take place in
the near future), and hence the crisis that brought the government to the
Fund in the first place had passed and pressures to conform with the
agreed-upon program were therefore much smaller.
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22. There are two dimensions of “strong” and “weak.” On one hand, there is the magnitude
of the fiscal, monetary, exchange rate, and other adjustments. On the other hand, there is a
question as to the period of time during which these adjustments are phased in. There is in-
creasing, but by no means conclusive, evidence that changes in the key macroeconomic vari-
ables that are carried out quickly have smaller costs than those that are phased in over a longer
time period, for a variety of reasons. First, a rapid change in macroeconomic signals sends a
message that policymakers are serious in their determination to restore macroeconomic equi-
librium. Second, those sectors of the economy (exportables, in particular) which benefit from
reforms are likely to respond more rapidly when the adjustment is made at once than when
it is phased in over time. Third, the political opposition faces a higher hurdle in its eﬀorts to
oppose and overturn reforms that have already been achieved than it does for those that
are merely announced as intended at a future date. The above discussion, therefore, refers to
the magnitude of the altered policies, not the speed. It should be noted, however, that some
changes—such as in government expenditures or in tax structures—inevitably require time.
For this reason, there was obvious cause for concern that countries, once
having received financial support and experienced a much-relaxed current
account situation, would revert to their fiscal and monetary habits that had
brought on the crisis in the first place. To avoid this, the Fund’s programs
typically imposed “conditionality,” and Fund resources were extended only
after staﬀ reviewed the key macroeconomic performance indicators agreed
upon. Thus, there was not a single domestic credit ceiling: there were ceil-
ings specified for each six-month or one-year interval for the life of the pro-
gram. Fiscal performance was also specified for a sequence of periods.
What this led to was the release of a tranche of funding once a Fund pro-
gram was initially announced, with specified future dates at which further
tranches would be released, assuming the country met its targets set forth in
the LOI. It often happened that, on review for release of a later tranche, targets
would not have been met. As already indicated, anticipating macroeconomic
events is not a precise science, and the task of the IMF staﬀ in the review
was threefold: (a) to ascertain the extent to which the failure to meet targets
threatened the success of the program; (b) to determine the extent to which
failures to meet targets were a result of unanticipated macroeconomic shocks,
of misestimation of the economy’s response to the program, or, instead, of
failure to implement the program; and (c) renegotiate targets for subsequent
tranches in light of the findings with respect to the first two questions. When
the failure to meet targets was the consequence of internal policy, the task was
to ascertain whether it was feasible to get the program back to a place where
there was a realistic chance of success, or whether to abandon the program.
Evidently, judgment had to be used. The first question—whether the
failure to meet targets was of suﬃcient magnitude and likely duration23—is
often a judgment call. Even when the cause of failure is clearly external (as,
for example, an unanticipated increase in the price of oil leading to a larger
fiscal and current account deficit than in the program), changes in targets
may be warranted. Even when the cause of failure is governmental inaction
(as happens, for example, when tax reforms are turned down by Parlia-
ment), a question is whether suﬃcient action could and would be taken in
the immediate future to get the program back on track.
Needless to say, a number of fund programs have been canceled, and
many others have had targets renegotiated.24 Even in the initial program, it
is always a diﬃcult judgment call as to how much fiscal and monetary tight-
ening and how much exchange rate change is the minimum that would have
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23. Sometimes, unanticipated delays in fiscal expenditure reductions or increased tax re-
ceipts can occur that would be serious if sustained, but for which there is evidence that the de-
lay was once and for all. And, of course, if the fiscal target is a deficit reduction of, say, 1 per-
cent of GDP over a six-month period, there is a question as to whether 0.99 percent of GDP,
0.9 percent of GDP, 0.8 percent of GDP reduction, or some other number is suﬃciently close
as to warrant continuing support.
24. See Ergin (1999) for data on the number of cancellations and renegotiations over the
years.
a significant chance for successful outcomes. There is also a question as to
the ability and willingness of the relevant government oﬃcials in the pro-
gram country to undertake the agreed-upon policies. Once the program is
under way, information on terms of trade, weather, and other variables re-
moves some uncertainties but increases others.
In fact, many IMF programs have failed to reverse the underlying eco-
nomic trends.25 Especially in the 1960s and 1970s, a typical experience was
the “stop-go” cycle, in which the inauguration of a Fund program marked
a period during which the government fiscal deficit and the rate of domes-
tic credit creation were reduced, while the depreciated real exchange rate in-
duced a reduced quantity demanded of imports and an increased flow of
exports. These usually resulted in some degree of domestic recession (de-
pending on whether the expansionary eﬀects of import liberalization with
the associated greater availability of intermediate goods and raw materials
and of greater exports oﬀset the contractionary eﬀects of tighter monetary
and fiscal policy). That, in turn, released further goods into export channels
and reduced the demand for imports. Simultaneously, reduced domestic
demand usually more than oﬀset other eﬀects, to result in—at least tem-
porarily—a reduction in the rate of inflation.
However, once these eﬀects had been taking hold for some time, govern-
ments typically began to increase expenditures and ease the monetary situa-
tion. As that happened, the real exchange rate began appreciating,26 and,
with it, the incipient current account deficit once again began increasing. In-
flationary pressure accelerated, and, with it, the boom component of the
cycle was once again under way. The boom ended when the next exchange
rate or debt-servicing crisis became too costly, and once again the IMF was
approached. This was referred to as developing countries’ “stop-go” cycles.
Hence, even before 1973 and the first oil price increase,27 a number of
countries had had multiple IMF programs.28 In some instances, they were
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25. See Krueger (1978) for an early tabulation of the real exchange rates prevailing one, two,
and three years after devaluations in ten developing countries in the 1950s, 1960s, and early
1970s. See Edwards (1989) for a review of the experience with a much larger number of coun-
tries over the 1970s and 1980s.
26. The index of dollar prices of tradable goods was virtually constant over the period from
1952 to 1969. As a consequence, any country with even a 5 percent rate of domestic inflation
at a fixed exchange rate experienced real appreciation of its currency. Many developing coun-
tries had average inflation rates well in excess of that number, although the average rate of in-
flation across countries rose markedly after 1973.
27. After 1973, most developing countries continued to maintain fixed nominal exchange
rates, or crawling pegs, which could lead to problems if the terms of trade deteriorated sharply.
For this reason, they continued to call upon the IMF for support even after the industrialized
countries’ abandonment of fixed exchange rates had markedly diminished the fund’s role with
respect to their economies.
28. It is sometimes argued that finance ministers and other economic policymakers know that
the IMF will support a program and that they therefore accept more risk than they would in the
absence of the IMF. However, there is ample evidence that economic policy oﬃcials, and espe-
cially central bankers, who are in oﬃce at times of crisis quickly lose their jobs. See Cooper (1971).
almost continuous; in others, several years separated the resort to Fund
support. In Chile, for example, there were Fund programs in 1956, 1959,
and 1965 even prior to the inflation expansion set oﬀ under President Al-
lende and the massive adjustment of the mid-1970s (see Behrman 1976).
There were Fund programs in Turkey in 1958, 1970, and 1977, prior to the
Turkish reforms of 1980. During the latter half of the 1970s, there were re-
peated renegotiations and abandonments of programs.
Before turning to the role of financial transactions in these crises and re-
sponses, I need to stress two final points. First, until the 1980s, the majority
of developing countries used fixed nominal exchange rate regimes, so that a
devaluation was an important part of their stabilization programs. Inap-
propriate real exchange rates led to retarded growth or depressed export
earnings, increased imports or increasingly restrictive import licensing, de-
pressed capital inflows, and encouraged various forms of illegal transac-
tions to enable capital flight. By the 1970s, some of these costs were being
recognized, and a few developing countries began experimenting with al-
ternative exchange rate regimes. A few countries permitted their exchange
rate to float during the crisis or in a period immediately afterward, prior to
fixing a new nominal exchange rate. Some others, most notably Colombia
and Brazil, began using a crawling peg exchange rate regime, under which
the nominal exchange rate was altered at relatively frequent intervals ac-
cording to a formula under which the adjustment was suﬃcient to com-
pensate between the rate of inflation in the country in question and the av-
erage rate in its major trading partners.
The second point is that, although exchange controls certainly restricted
the free flow of capital, and private capital flows were relatively small con-
trasted with oﬃcial flows or their magnitudes in the 1990s, businesses and
individuals found plenty of ways to evade exchange controls, and capital
flight was often the trigger for a balance-of-payments crisis. Capital flight
may be easier and more sensitive to small changes in macroeconomic mag-
nitudes in the 1990s than it was in earlier decades, but it is not new.
4.1.2 Financial Crises
There have been a number of episodes of financial crisis with minimal
balance-of-payments involvement over the years. The United States had
many such crises in the nineteenth century, a major motive for establishing
the Federal Reserve System. Sweden had a major financial crisis in 1992,
which was again largely national and financial in origin, although the crown
was also attacked (the overnight interest rate rose to an annual rate of over
400 percent at the peak of the crisis). And, of course, Japan’s diﬃculties in
the 1990s have had a weak banking system as a major underlying factor.
Even the American savings and loan problem of the early 1980s represented
a financial crisis, although it was relatively small scale contrasted with many
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others,29 as measured by the percentage of the overall financial system
aﬀected or by the percentage of GDP of the ultimate bailout cost.
Because it has primarily been the banks that have been involved in the
twin crises of the 1990s, I shall speak of banks as if they were the only im-
portant financial institution. Clearly, they are not, but since they are central
and were major for the crises of concern here, it will simplify the exposition
to refer to the “banks” rather than to “financial-sector institutions.”
The business of financial intermediation is important for development
and economic growth, because intermediation enables the resources savers
make available for investment to be allocated to their best uses. By its na-
ture, the finding of those best uses requires a skilled assessment of the likely
future outcome of any given venture. That outcome is determined by sev-
eral things: (a) the ability of the borrower; (b) the prospect that the proposed
venture is technically feasible at a cost such that there will be suﬃcient de-
mand in the market to make it pay; and (c) that the external environment
does not change in ways that negatively impact the venture. All three of
these components are better judged by trained professionals than others,
but each of them is nonetheless subject to uncertainty.
Even the best of bank lending oﬃcers does not have a perfect record of
forecasting which would-be borrowers will be successful and enabled to ser-
vice their loans. In some instances, the debtor’s plans simply do not work; in
others, unforeseen circumstances (a deep recession, changing consumer
tastes, development by a competitor of a superior substitute) can lead to the
failure of a venture to yield a suﬃcient cash flow to enable debt servicing.
All banks have, and should have,30 some nonperforming loans (NPLs)
and reserves against NPLs. Moreover, since banks charge a higher interest
rate on riskier loans, mechanisms must be devised to provide incentives and
an environment in which bankers manage risk appropriately. If, for ex-
ample, the owner of a bank has none of his own capital invested in it, he has
nothing to lose if risky loans fail, and he will therefore have an incentive to
have too risky a portfolio. It is for this reason that capital adequacy re-
quirements are a part of reasonable banking regulation.
When the fraction of NPLs (recorded or not) increases, banks must
charge higher interest rates on the rest of their portfolio to cover their costs
and be profitable than would be the case with a smaller fraction of NPLs. In
the extreme case when there are no performing loans, a bank’s capacities to
lend are entirely destroyed, but in fact that occurs long before NPLs absorb
the entire portfolio.
Because of this, a bank that experiences above-average diﬃculty with its
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29. It is not clear whether the savings and loan problem would have remained “small-scale”
if it had not been handled reasonably quickly. One of the characteristics of weak financial in-
stitutions is that there is a tendency for problems to spread.
30. If a bank had no nonperforming loans (NPLs) on its books, it would either have been far
too conservative in its lending policies or it would be failing to write down bad loans.
loan portfolio is highly vulnerable, because potential “sound” borrowers
will be able to borrow at lower cost from other banks, leaving only riskier
borrowers approaching the troubled bank, and depositors may attempt to
shift their funds as information about the financial health of the institution
becomes known. This, in turn, lowers the bank’s reserve ratio. As these
things happen, the fraction of NPLs is likely to rise still further.
When a number of banks experience an increasing fraction of NPLs si-
multaneously, the failure of any one or several of them results in losses to
the depositors and shareholders. Those losses, in turn, weaken their asset
position and can impair the ability of some of that group to service their ob-
ligations. As that happens, there is further weakening of the balance sheets.
At some point, depositors recognize the danger to the banks and begin at-
tempting to withdraw their funds, thus leading to the banking crisis. If
banks are forced to refuse repayment, those depositors in turn become fur-
ther handicapped in servicing their obligations, and, in addition, panic is
likely to ensue.
When the banking system is so weak (i.e., when it has such a high frac-
tion of NPLs in its portfolio) or is indeed under attack by depositors who
have lost confidence in it, there are major risks in failure of the government
to act. In particular, as individual financial institutions become unable to
meet the demands for withdrawals, the liquidity of depositors falls, they fall
behind or further behind on their debt-servicing obligations, and a down-
ward spiral can occur in the absence of action.
To restore the banking system to economic health requires a number of
measures. A first is to restore the banks’ balance sheets. That may entail re-
moving the bad paper from the banks, or it may entail forcing some healthy
banks to consolidate with some that are impaired, or it may involve the gov-
ernment’s acquiring the NPLs from the banks’ portfolios in exchange for
other assets.31 Achieving that is diﬃcult for a number of reasons: (a) re-
sources must be raised, usually from taxpayers, to bail out the banks, which
is inherently unpopular; (b) major questions arise and must be addressed re-
garding the valuation to be placed on NPLs; (c) without careful attention,
borrowers who could repay a fraction, but not all, of their debt will have no
incentives to repay at all, and hence the fraction of NPLs and associated
losses is likely to rise; and (d) when businesses are heavily indebted to banks,
restructuring the individual firms’ finances and indeed replacing debt with
equity in their portfolios may be an essential part of the workout process.
As will be seen below, this has certainly been true in Korea.
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31. As will be seen below, in Indonesia, the government bought up the bad paper in the
banking system, giving the banks nonnegotiable treasury bills in exchange for these NPLs.
Since nonnegotiable bills cannot be lent, there was little new credit available in the Indonesian
banking system. That being the case, even borrowers who could have serviced their bank debts
ceased doing so, knowing that if they repaid their loans, they would not receive new credits.
This is one major reason why the recovery of the Indonesian economy is so slow.
Hence, “restoring banks’ portfolios” is not a single activity. It requires
valuation of the individual items in banks’ portfolios, itself a lengthy pro-
cess, as well as the development of arrangements for partially creditworthy
borrowers to refinance their obligations. Further, it requires the develop-
ment of incentives for banks to change their pattern of behavior, usually by
raising capital adequacy standards and perhaps reevaluating the risk char-
acteristics of various lending categories.32 However, this latter procedure is
tricky, especially at a time of financial crisis, when there are few potential
domestic lenders.33 Moreover, if foreign banks that do have the equity are
permitted entry before the domestic banking system is restored to health,
the fact that the new entrants are not carrying a significant fraction of NPLs
on their books means that they can lend at a lower rate than the domestic
banks to achieve the same profitability. If instead governments attempt to
have healthy banks absorb less healthy ones, they must also insure equitable
treatment for shareholders of the healthy banks, ensure that the newly
merged banks are financially sound, and be willing to close banks with
highly impaired balance sheets.
However, a government that undertook these actions and did nothing
else would be failing to take any measures to prevent a recurrence of a bank-
ing crisis. If, for example, the weakness of the banking system came about
because banks accepted too much risk, there is little point in restoring the
banks’ balance sheets without attempting to reduce the probability that
they will once again develop an overly risky portfolio.34 Hence comes the
need for strengthening capital adequacy requirements and also, usually, for
strengthening prudential supervision.
Strengthening prudential supervision requires both changes in the regu-
latory framework and improved capabilities of the regulatory authorities.
Although changing the regulatory framework may meet political opposi-
tion (on behalf of those benefiting from the prior status of the banks), it is
relatively simple to accomplish. However, strengthening prudential super-
vision requires more resources in the regulatory oﬃces, and those resources
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32. One of the precrisis “distortions” in the global financial system at the time of the Asian
financial crisis was that the Bank for International Settlements capital adequacy standards as-
signed a lower risk category to short-term than to long-term lending, thus encouraging a
shorter-term structure of debt than would otherwise have occurred. Since the focus here is on
IMF programs, however, that issue is outside the scope of this paper.
33. Failure to achieve capital adequacy appears to have been a significant contributor to the
diﬃculties the Mexican government faced over the refinancing of the banks. The private own-
ers of banks, it is said, had to a considerable degree acquired the funds to purchase their banks
by borrowing from each other! Thus, although there were individual “owners” of banks, these
“owners” were in fact in debt to other banks and had little to lose if their banks went bankrupt.
34. There is considerable evidence that the banks were extending credit to risky endeavors in
the years leading up to the Asian financial crises and in Mexico prior to the 1994 crisis. Rates
of increase of domestic credit, and the increment of domestic credit as a percentage of GDP,
were very high—going to over 20 percent annually in Indonesia (contrasted with domestic
credit expansion of less than 3 percent of GDP per year in industrialized countries).
include trained bank examiners. Increasing the pool of qualified individu-
als is usually a drawn-out process.
Relating these considerations to developing countries, and to the finan-
cial crises of the 1990s, requires a step back to consider the role of banks in
those countries. The importance of banks relative to the entire financial in-
termediation industry in developing countries is much greater than it is in
wealthier countries. At very early stages of development, banks are virtu-
ally the only source of finance for enterprises with profitable investments
they wish to pursue.35 At that stage, most developing countries controlled
the banks, imposing a ceiling both on the lending rate and on the deposit
rate well below that that would have prevailed in a well-functioning finan-
cial market. For developing countries with appropriate policies, there were
many profitable investment opportunities and consequent large excess de-
mand for loans at the regulated rates. Governments typically oversaw credit
rationing, requiring banks to give priority to particular activities at the ex-
pense of others.36 For example, in Korea in the early years after the opening
up of the economy and the encouragement of exports, banks were in-
structed to lend to exporters at preferential interest rates.37 In other coun-
tries, credit to small farmers, to small businesses, or to other favored groups
has been rationed at below-market interest rates. In other countries, how-
ever, preferential credit was directed to cronies or to politically influential
individuals or groups.
When credit rationing prevails, the task of bank lending oﬃcers is sim-
plified. In circumstances such as those that prevailed in Korea in the 1960s,
almost any investment was bound to have a payoﬀ in excess of the bank
lending rate: Concerns with the creditworthiness of individual borrowers
were very few, because the spectacular rate of economic growth (13 percent
annual average) insured that almost anything would be profitable. The need
for prudential supervision is much weaker than when there are competitive
banking systems and market-determined lending practices, because banks
under credit rationing are not really competing with each other but in eﬀect
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35. Almost by definition, the citizens of a poor country at the early stages of development
have accumulated very little equity, and the ratio of bank loans outstanding to the value of cap-
ital stock, especially in the business sector, is very high. As development proceeds, that ratio
can be expected to decline, but for countries that began rapid development within the past sev-
eral decades, it is still well below that in industrial countries’ markets.
36. In the 1960s, for example, the government of Korea regulated interest rates and directed
credit allocations. The estimated real rate of interest on Korea Development Bank Loans in
the period from 1962 to 1966, for example, ranged from –0.8 percent to –26 percent. During
the rest of the decade, the real rate of interest was positive, but never exceeded 6.1 percent. By
contrast, estimated real rates of return on investment ranged from 20 to 35 percent. The curb,
or informal, market rate of interest for those seeking additional funding was well over 40 per-
cent throughout the decade, whereas the nominal rate of interest on bank lending never
reached 30 percent. See Hong (1981).
37. It is important to note that all exporters were entitled to preferential credit, which was
allocated according to formulas based only on export performance. There was no commodity-
specific diﬀerentiation among exports.
have a governmentally imposed monopoly. In those circumstances, to the
extent that the interest rate is suppressed and banks have any choice among
would-be borrowers, they naturally choose to lend to the safest borrowers,
who will in eﬀect be receiving a subsidy when they get loans at below-
market interest rates.38
When a financial crisis occurs, the age-old prescription is to ease mone-
tary policy generally and then for the central bank to follow the advice of
Bagehot: lend freely at high interest rates to borrowers with good collat-
eral. The point of this policy prescription is that healthy banks (or other fi-
nancial institutions) that are illiquid because of the financial crisis need to
be sorted out from those that are unhealthy and those that are (and would
be even in the absence of crisis) insolvent. Simultaneously, a relatively easy
money policy reduces the debt-servicing burden for borrowers, so that at
the margin there are fewer NPLs. Indeed, a quick, but not necessarily de-
sirable, way out of a financial crisis would be to inflate, especially if most
loans have been made at fixed nominal interest rates. Inflation would ease
the debt-servicing burden, although its other eﬀects can have negative con-
sequences and outweigh the benefits of reduced debt-servicing obliga-
tions.
4.1.3 Twin Crises
An economy aﬄicted with either a balance-of-payments crisis or a finan-
cial crisis presents the policymaker with serious challenges. To confront a
balance-of-payments crisis, the appropriate policy responses entail an ex-
change rate change, tightening of monetary policy, and tightened fiscal pol-
icy. These measures, in turn, may require other supporting policy actions.
To stem a financial crisis, by contrast, entails loosening of monetary policy,
maintenance (or even appreciation) of the nominal exchange rate, and fi-
nancial restructuring. Moreover, as is further elaborated below, an ex-
change rate adjustment as part of the response to a balance-of-payments or
debt-servicing crisis can trigger a suﬃcient impairment of bank balance
sheets to precipitate a simultaneous financial crisis. To a significant degree,
in the presence of twin crises, whatever is done to address one will, in the
short run, make the other worse.
In this section, I first address potential components of the policy package
and their role, and later I address issues of sequencing and trade-oﬀs across
potential policy actions.
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38. In some developing countries where import-substitution policies were followed, banks
were directed to lend to them. Although they were often economically unsound, the firms pro-
ducing import-substituting goods typically held sheltered and profitable positions in the do-
mestic market and hence were financially profitable. However, in countries where much lend-
ing is directed toward “cronies” who have little intention to repay, a financial crisis can result
from these practices.
Policies to Meet a Balance-of-Payments Crisis
Exchange Rate Change
An exchange rate change is necessary once foreign exchange reserves are
being depleted in circumstances in which the prevailing real exchange rate is
unrealistic. As has already been seen, when policymakers have chosen a fixed
nominal exchange rate regime39 and inflation rates have exceeded those in the
rest of the world, the real appreciation of the currency gives speculators a
one-sided bet: they can be reasonably confident that the currency will not
appreciate in nominal terms, so they cannot lose (except for any forgone in-
terest on holding foreign exchange relative to domestic currency), and they
will gain in the event that there is a devaluation. In these circumstances, once
capital outflows start increasing, there comes a point when only an exchange
rate change of suﬃcient magnitude can deter further outflows.
The policymaker can choose to let the rate float or to announce and sup-
port a new, but more depreciated, fixed exchange rate. Three points need to
be noted. A first one is that it is almost always domestic residents (who are
closer to the scene and thus better informed) who are first to attempt to get
out of local currency. Second, as already noted, there are many ways for do-
mestic residents to move into foreign currency even under degrees of capi-
tal inconvertibility. Thus, it is not only the failure of foreign creditors to roll
over loans or extend new financing that can place pressure on the foreign
exchange rate; much of the domestic money supply can also do so.
Second, an exchange rate alteration may be inadequate to calm the mar-
kets. Indeed, there are numerous instances in which the announcement of a
new exchange rate has not reduced pressures: this happened in Mexico af-
ter the initial devaluation in December 1994.40 Even a devalued exchange
rate may be deemed “inappropriate” by market participants. For that rea-
son, many policymakers have chosen to let their exchange rate float, at least
in the immediate aftermath of a currency crisis. In that way, speculators face
a two-way bet, and the exchange rate is market determined.41 When foreign
exchange reserves are minimal, and no additional resources are available
from other sources, there is no option but to float the exchange rate.
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39. A crawling peg regime was also susceptible to speculative pressures when circumstances
should have led to a change in the real exchange rate. Such was the case in Brazil on several oc-
casions when Brazil had a crawling peg exchange rate policy. These exchange rate changes were
referred to as “maxi-devaluations” to distinguish them from the ongoing adjustments to main-
tain purchasing power parity.
40. For a chronology of events immediately prior to, during, and after the crisis, see IMF
(1995, 53–79).
41. There is another advantage to floating the exchange rate: during the period in which a
fixed exchange rate is defended, the foreign exchange authority (usually the central bank) is
usually selling foreign exchange at the old exchange rate; if success of the currency is unsuc-
cessful, foreign exchange reserves are built up at the new, depreciated exchange rate. Conse-
quently, a central bank can incur large losses in an unsuccessful defense of the exchange rate.
Floating the rate guarantees that there will not be large central bank losses.
Third, although it is impossible to assert that there could never be a for-
eign exchange crisis under a floating exchange rate system, the probability
of such a crisis is considerably reduced relative to that incurred under a fixed
exchange rate when domestic monetary and fiscal policy are not targeted to
the dictates of maintaining that rate.42 Moreover, as will be argued shortly,
a floating exchange rate regime would be less likely to have significant for-
eign currency–denominated unhedged debts and therefore would be con-
siderably less vulnerable to a twin crisis.
Tightening Monetary Policy
People move out of domestic currency into foreign currency because they
expect a higher (risk-adjusted) return on holding foreign exchange than on
holding domestic currency. As domestic interest rates rise, the cost of mov-
ing into foreign currency rises. Indeed, when the interest rate is high enough
and the time horizon in which devaluation might occur is long enough, the
costs to investors of holding lower-yielding foreign assets can be made suﬃ-
ciently high to induce them to hold (high-interest-yielding, short-term) do-
mestic assets. Hence, a higher domestic interest rate deters—at least at the
margin—investors from moving out of assets denominated in domestic cur-
rency into foreign currency.
Thus, the conventional prescription for a balance-of-payments crisis is to
tighten monetary policy, in order to make holding of domestic assets more
attractive. This must, of course, be part of a package including an exchange
rate change, because if an exchange rate change is thought to be imminent,
there is no realistic possibility of attracting foreign funds. Even if the ex-
pected devaluation were only 10 percent and were anticipated with a high
probability to occur within a week, that would require an overnight rate of
interest equivalent to an annual rate of over 50,000 percent plus the return
on the foreign asset to equate the expected returns and hence leave investors
indiﬀerent between domestic and foreign assets. Obviously, such a rate
would bring all domestic transactions to a virtual halt.43
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42. The crisis would manifest itself diﬀerently, however: the government in a country with
large debts denominated in foreign currency might find itself unwilling or unable to raise suﬃ-
cient tax revenue to purchase foreign exchange in the market, thereby triggering heightened in-
flationary pressures in its eﬀorts to repay debt. Moreover, the debt-servicing burden might be
suﬃciently large that a depreciating exchange rate resulted in a larger fiscal deficit, which in
turn would lead to a higher rate of inflation. The need for macroeconomic stabilization would
be every bit as great as in the crises of the 1990s, but it is likely that the magnitude of the debt-
servicing obligations, relative to GDP and exports, would have to be considerably larger than
it was in the countries experiencing twin crises in the 1990s.
43. In the 1950s and the 1960s when Chile confronted a balance-of-payments crisis, the
authorities used to impose a 10,000 percent “guarantee deposit requirement.” This was the
amount of money, expressed as a percentage of the import cost plus insurance and freight price,
that the would-be importer had to deposit, interest free (in the context of a three-digit annual
rate of inflation) at the time of placing his order for foreign goods. The deposit would be returned
after the goods had cleared customs. Because the lag between order and delivery in Chile was
typically six months or longer, this was equivalent to a tax of many times the import cost of the
good. Not surprisingly, imports ceased when the guarantee deposit requirement was imposed.
Adjusting Fiscal Policy
In order to avoid accelerating and finally hyperinflation, of course, fiscal
deficits have to be held under control. In many developing countries, these
deficits are large enough that the monetary authorities are virtually forced
to buy up new issues of government debt and maintain relatively easy mon-
etary policy in order that the burden of the domestic debt-service obliga-
tions not become so large that that becomes destabilizing. Hence, tighten-
ing fiscal policy so that government domestic debt will not increase—or at
least not by more than can be financed—is also a necessary part of any sta-
bilization program.44
Of course, the higher the ratio of government domestic debt to GDP, the
more costly it is to the government to have increased interest rates. When
interest rates rise by 10 percentage points or more, the increased financing
needs of a government with outstanding debt equal to 50 percent of GDP
are equivalent to 5 percent or more of GDP. Raising such a large additional
sum without triggering inflation is exceptionally diﬃcult. Hence, the degree
to which monetary policy can be tightened is partly a function of the rela-
tive size of government debt. For that reason, the increase in domestic in-
terest rates automatically increases the prospective fiscal deficit because in-
terest-carrying costs of the debt will increase. Since it is also likely that
economic activity will slow, tax collections are likely to be somewhat below
prior estimates, whereas fiscal expenditures may—unless adjusted—be
higher. As a result, some fiscal tightening is called for, even in the event that
the fiscal situation going into the crisis was reasonably balanced.
Thus, the ideal combination of exchange rate adjustment, fiscal curtail-
ment, and monetary tightening depends heavily on the relative magnitudes
of foreign currency–denominated and domestic government debt at the time
of crisis. A country with little internal and much external debt would find the
increased fiscal cost lower with relatively tighter monetary policy and less ex-
change rate adjustment (because more devaluation means a higher local-
currency cost of debt service); a country with a large domestic debt and few
foreign currency–denominated obligations would find a package with a
larger exchange rate adjustment and a smaller degree of monetary tighten-
ing to raise debt-servicing charges by a smaller amount more attractive.45
Policies to Meet a Financial Crisis
Just as quelling a balance-of-payments crisis requires restoration of the
belief that the exchange rate is sustainable, or at least that the odds are even
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44. It is also necessary because it is essential that expectations be altered. In the absence of
fiscal tightening, the credibility of the stabilization program is at risk.
45. A strong case can be made that expansion of domestic credit under a fixed exchange rate
regime is equivalent to increasing the contingent liabilities of the government, since the gov-
ernment is in fact implicitly guaranteeing that it will buy domestic currency at a specified rate.
as to whether it will appreciate or depreciate, a financial crisis requires res-
toration of confidence in the financial system. However, there is no “quick
fix,” parallel to floating or altering the exchange rate, that can achieve
that result.
The measures mentioned in section 4.1.2—getting the bad paper out of
the banking system while restructuring the debt of those who can pay part
of their obligations, recapitalizing the banks, and providing incentives to
avoid a repeat of the financial system’s diﬃculties—all take time. Moreover,
each one of these activities is contentious. Often, corporate restructuring to
reduce the burden of debt is a necessary first step, entailing, for example, the
exchange of debt of the companies for equity. However, the more favorable
the terms are to the companies, the less favorable they are to the banks, and
vice versa. Hence, it usually requires relatively strong oversight on the part
of regulators or oﬃcials to push both parties to a division of the losses.
Determination of the value of the banks’ assets is itself problematic. This
is especially so because it is always tempting to assume that debtors will be
able to increase their debt servicing once economic activity resumes, al-
though experience suggests that economic activity does not fully resume
until financial restructuring is achieved or at least well advanced.
Even when corporates (and the finances of other debtors) are restruc-
tured, however, there remains the problem of restoring the banks’ balance
sheets. This requires valuations of outstanding loans, and appropriate clas-
sification as to their risk category. Moreover, once these valuations—which
are also contentious—take place, new owners, or at least new capital, must
be found for the banks.46 If an eﬀort is made to merge weak banks with
stronger ones, the terms on which this is done are also problematic.
At the point when these activities are advancing, which necessarily takes
time, there is also a question as to how the losses will be financed. Govern-
ments can buy the bad paper from the banks’ portfolios, but that shifts the
burden to the taxpayers. Moreover, if they buy the paper from the banks, the
banks have little incentive to collect even what they can from their debtors.
Because these are key issues in the recovery of some of the Asian countries,
these issues are discussed in more concrete form in section 4.1.4 below.
Interaction of Balance-of-Payments and Financial Crises
Enough has been said to give an indication of the diﬃculties entailed
when either a balance-of-payments or a financial crisis takes place. Policy-
makers must take immediate action in circumstances in which the magni-
tudes of response of the aﬀected parties are unpredictable and expectations
are clearly of great importance.
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46. In Mexico, it would appear that one of the problems was that new bank owners lent to
each other to finance their acquisition of equity interests. This, in turn, meant that the new
owners had nothing to lose by undertaking risky loans.
However, when there is a weak banking system and a balance-of-
payments crisis occurs, the latter can trigger a financial crisis. There are sev-
eral mechanisms by which this can happen:
1. When banks have been borrowing abroad at a fixed nominal exchange
rate to fund their asset base, a devaluation necessarily increases the liability
side of their balance sheet and leaves the asset side virtually unaﬀected.
Hence, the banks’ balance sheets deteriorate.
2. If borrowers from banks have either borrowed from the domestic
banking system but incurred their liabilities in foreign exchange, or them-
selves borrowed oﬀshore in addition to borrowing from the banks, a deval-
uation automatically results in a deteriorating of the borrowers’ balance
sheets. For firms that are engaged in exporting and importing, this eﬀect is
likely to be fairly small because export proceeds or domestic currency pay-
ments from imports rise pari passu with the devaluation. However, for firms
whose costs are determined in the international market but whose receipts
are determined in local currency, income and balance sheets are likely to de-
teriorate. If the banking system was weak prior to the crisis (as was true in
most of the Asian crisis countries), the additional hits they take as a result
of the devaluation result in further deterioration of their balance sheets.
3. When the monetary authority responds to a balance-of-payments cri-
sis by tightening money with a consequent increase in interest rates, debt-
servicing costs to individual borrowers necessarily increase. Again, out-
standing loans of marginal borrowers are likely to be tipped into NPL
status as interest-carrying costs on their outstanding indebtedness increase.
4. Insofar as fiscal and monetary tightening result in a (necessary) slack-
ening in the pace of economic activity, that too aﬀects borrowers’ incomes
and cash flows and hence impairs their ability to service their debts.
All of these eﬀects weaken the banking system further. How important each
of them is varies from country to country. In Mexico, it is thought that the
increase in interest rates was the major factor that added significantly to the
8 percent of bank loans outstanding that were already nonperforming be-
fore the crisis.47 In Korea, the banks’ losses on their holdings of Russian and
other securities combined with the inability of domestic firms to service
debts to weaken the banking system.
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47. See IMF (1995, 62). The IMF reports that about 8.5 percent of loans outstanding were
past due before the crisis. Foreign currency loans were about one-third of the loans extended
by Mexican banks, but many of them were to companies whose income was peso-
denominated. As the IMF reports, “The sharp rise in interest rates also aﬀected the peso-loan
portfolio. . . . When interest rates reached levels as high as 80 percent in the first quarter of
1995, payments ceased on a large proportion of loans of all types. Banks generally chose to re-
structure these loans, or simply to suspend interest payments, rather than to be forced to rec-
ognize them as high-risk assets and write oﬀ a certain amount of their already declining cap-
ital by making provisions. Nevertheless, the deterioration in asset quality forced the
risk-weighted capital ratios of several Mexican banks below the 8 percent minimum” (62–63).
The diﬃculty for policymakers is that when the banking system is very
fragile or already in crisis, any actions that are taken to mitigate the bal-
ance-of-payments crisis are likely to weaken the banks still further, whereas
any measures taken to shore up the domestic banking system (such as the
easing of monetary conditions) will make the balance-of-payments crisis
worse. Hence, policymakers both in the country and at the IMF are tread-
ing a fine line: too much reaction to the balance-of-payments crisis can re-
sult in a financial crisis if there is not one already or make it worse if there
is one. Conversely, too much attention to the financial situation when the
country is already vulnerable to external attack can invite that attack and
destabilize the foreign exchange account.
These diﬃculties are clearly illustrated for the cases of Indonesia and Ko-
rea, discussed in the next section. Before that, however, there are two other
points. First, countries with a sound banking system, such as Brazil in early
1998, have a much easier time of adjusting and resuming economic growth.
In the Brazilian case, there was very little NPL paper in the banking system
prior to the devaluation, and Brazilian banks had little or no foreign-
currency debt, whereas their clients’ debts were mostly denominated in do-
mestic currency.
Second, and more relevant for understanding the policy response and the
IMF packages in the case of the Asian crises, there is clearly a desirable or
necessary sequencing for responses to crises. Although it is straightforward
(and essential) to allow the exchange rate to depreciate immediately and to
tighten money (at least to some extent, depending on the government’s bal-
ance sheet), there are long time lags involved in financial restructuring. For-
tunately, the job does not need to be done perfectly in order for economic
activity to reverse its downward course, and there appears to be room for
fine-tuning after the initial restructuring. Nonetheless, what does seem evi-
dent is that countries do not achieve a rebound and reversal of their diﬃ-
culties after a twin crisis until such time as they are able to provide suﬃcient
incentives for the banks to resume lending activity. When that does not hap-
pen, as for example in Japan in the 1990s, the crisis can transform itself into
a long period of sluggish or negligible growth.
4.1.4 International Monetary Fund Stabilization Programs in Action
As the above discussion indicates, the number of factors that contribute
to the onset of a crisis is large, and each crisis diﬀers in some regards from
others. Attempting to evaluate or assess stabilization programs in general
is diﬃcult precisely because these diﬀerences matter in program design. It
is useful, therefore, to provide some case studies of IMF stabilization pro-
grams. Each twin crisis of the 1990s has been complex, and books could be
and no doubt will be written about each of them. In what follows, empha-
sis is placed on those factors that seem most important (or that have gen-
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erated most criticism) in evaluating IMF stabilization programs and on
linkages between domestic economies and the international financial sys-
tem.48
A first case to be examined is that of Korea, which is perhaps the best ex-
ample for intensive analysis. Thereafter, features diﬀerentiating the finan-
cial crisis in Indonesia are discussed.
The Korean Crisis49
Background
As is well known, Korea was one of the poorest countries in the world in
the late 1950s and was then widely regarded as a country without serious
growth prospects. After economic policy reforms began in the early 1960s,
Korea began growing at sustained rates previously unheard of in world his-
tory.50 Real GDP grew an average 13 percent per annum in the decade start-
ing 1963. High growth rates continued into the 1990s, and Korea’s real per
capita income in the mid-1990s was more than eight times what it had been
in the early 1960s.
In general, economic liberalization proceeded throughout the first thirty-
five years of Korea’s rapid growth. In 1960, the country had had the usual
developing-country mix of an overvalued exchange rate supported by quan-
titative restrictions on imports (and a black market in foreign exchange),
consequent high walls of protection for domestic manufacturers, price con-
trols on many key commodities, credit rationing, a large fiscal deficit, one
of the highest rates of inflation in the world, and a huge (averaging around
10 percent of GDP over the period 1953–58) current account deficit fi-
nanced largely by foreign aid inflows.51 Indeed, when the government of
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48. It should be recalled that focus here is on the extent to which stabilization programs en-
abled a cessation of capital flight and provided a basis for restoration of growth. One criticism
of IMF programs have been that there were too many conditions attached which, while per-
haps desirable in themselves or in the long run, were not essential to the stabilization eﬀort.
That concern is assessed in the paper by Goldstein (chap. 5 in this volume).
49. The IMF documents cited in this section may be found at [http://www.imf.org/exter-
nal/country/KOR/index.htm].
50. Taiwan’s rate of economic growth was equally rapid. There is truth to the frequently
made assertion that policymakers in each country watched the evolution of the other’s econ-
omy and policies, and that competition spurred each on. Prior to the crisis in the late 1990s,
most observers would have claimed that the major diﬀerence between the Taiwanese and Ko-
rean economies was the relatively small scale of Taiwanese enterprises contrasted with the
large share of the Korean chaebol in the Korean economy. There were other diﬀerences, how-
ever: perhaps because of greater strategic insecurity, the Taiwanese held very large foreign ex-
change reserves in relation to the size of their trade or their economy; the Taiwanese dollar
showed no tendency for real appreciation; and Taiwan’s current account had been consistently
in surplus. The Taiwanese financial system also appears to have been considerably sounder
than that of Korea, and the rate of expansion of domestic credit in the mid-1990s was much
lower than that in Korea.
51. See Krueger (1979) and Frank, Kim, and Westphal (1975) for an account of the early pe-
riod of Korea’s rapid development.
Syngman Rhee was overthrown in 1960, one of the main sources of dissat-
isfaction was reported to be corruption.
First steps included moving to a more realistic (and constant real) ex-
change rate for exports, and the relaxation of restrictions on importing for
exporters. Thereafter, imports were gradually liberalized and the exchange
rate regime unified by the early 1970s. In 1964, a major fiscal and tax reform
brought the government finances into a much-improved balance, and the
rate of inflation fell.52 Price controls were gradually removed, discrimina-
tion and price controls on key agricultural commodities were replaced with
a protective regime for agriculture, and nominal interest rates were permit-
ted to move to levels that at least made the real interest rate positive. How-
ever, credit rationing continued because it was below a market-clearing rate
(see Hong 1981). Only in the late 1980s were interest rates freed.
When economic policy reform began, Korea’s exports were only about 3
percent of GDP, whereas imports were about 13 percent. Policymakers
therefore began focusing on measures to increase exports. They did so by
encouraging all exports uniformly, but nonetheless they had something that
might be regarded as being close to an “export theory of value.” Any firm
that could export was rewarded in proportion to the foreign exchange re-
ceipts from exporting. Many of the firms that were initially successful were
chaebol (although they were very small at the time, and some Korean ana-
lysts today do not regard the Hyundais, Samsungs, and the like of the 1960s
as chaebol at all). Because they were successful, they grew rapidly. They re-
ceived new loans as their exports grew and as they expanded into new ex-
porting activities.53
The chaebol were successful exporters and, for the first decade or more of
Korean growth, were regarded almost as the heroes of Korean develop-
ment. They were rewarded for export performance. In addition, when the
authorities wanted a venture undertaken, they did so with the implicit guar-
antee of the government that credit, tax exemptions, and other support
would be available to make the venture profitable.54 However, the chaebol
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52. The oil price increase of 1973 triggered a large increase in the rate of inflation, but the
country rapidly returned to single-digit inflation. By the mid-1980s, there were even occasions
when the domestic price level was falling.
53. Some of these activities were chosen by the chaebol. On occasion, however, the authori-
ties suggested to chaebol owners that they should move into certain lines of production. This
attempt to “pick winners” was not always successful; when it reached its height in the heavy
and chemical industry (HCI) drive of the mid-1970s, the rate of economic growth and of ex-
port expansion slowed substantially, and policies were reversed by the late 1970s. When chae-
bol incurred losses while undertaking these mandated activities, the banks were directed to ex-
tend additional credit to the chaebol, thus setting a precedent for later diﬃculties.
54. It is important to underscore that these government “rewards” were there in the context
of the export drive. When chaebol could not produce competitive exports, there was little sup-
port. Even in the HCI drive—the most industry-specific interventionist phase of Korean pol-
icy—the output from HCI industries was to be exported within a specified period. When it be-
came clear that that performance test was not being passed, the entire thrust of the policy was
reevaluated.
were on the whole remarkably profitable and had little diﬃculty in servicing
their (subsidized) debt.
The extent to which the Korean economy changed structure is remark-
able. Exports and export earnings (the dollar price index of traded goods
being stable in the 1960s) grew at over 45 percent annually. Exports as a per-
centage of GDP rose from 3 percent in 1960 to 8.5 percent in 1970 to 35.2
percent in 1980; imports also rose, from their 10 percent level in 1960 to 43
percent of GDP in 1980. Hence, the Korean economy was much more open
as growth progressed.55
In the early years, rationed credit financed a large fraction of new invest-
ment, especially in the manufacturing sector. The subsidies implicit in this
credit served as a stimulus to industry and permitted much more rapid ex-
pansion than would have been possible had companies had to rely on rein-
vesting their own profits.56 The real rate of return was so high that all the
chaebol would happily have borrowed more had they been able to; most of
them, as reported by Hong (1981), borrowed additional funds at the much
higher curb market rates. That would imply that the lending at controlled
interest rates was, at least in the early years, equivalent to an intramarginal
subsidy to the chaebol. Estimates of their rates of return suggest that the
chaebol were highly profitable at that time even without subsidies. Indeed,
given the huge distortions in the economy that prevailed in the late 1950s, it
is likely that in the 1960s, at least, almost any reasonably sensible venture
into unskilled labor intensive exportable production had a high real rate of
return.
As already mentioned, by 1964, the borrowing rate from the banks was
positive in real terms. Over the following three decades, there were further
liberalizations of the financial system as the real interest rate charged for
loans rose, although credit was still rationed. At the same time, the real rate
of return on investments naturally fell as the very high initial returns obvi-
ously could not be sustained. Hence, the implicit subsidy to the borrowers
who received credit diminished sharply. When, in 1996 and 1997, gross prof-
its of some of the large enterprises fell sharply, their ability to service their
debt was impaired. However, in keeping with tradition, banks began “ever-
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55. Some of the increase in imports was of course intermediate goods used in the production
of exportables. However, the percentage import content of exports remained fairly stable at
around 35 percent of the value of exports over the period of rapid growth. From 1960 onward,
exporters were entitled to import virtually anything that they might use in producing exporta-
bles with little paperwork; in addition, they were permitted to import a “wastage” allowance,
which they were free to sell on the domestic market. Thus, the de facto liberalization exceeded
that which took place because of removal of quantitative restrictions and lowering of tariﬀs.
With an average tariﬀ rate in the tariﬀ schedule of around 15 percent in 1970, average tariﬀ col-
lections as a percent of imports were about 6 percent.
56. In much of the public discussion of the reliance of firms in crisis countries on borrowing,
what seems to be forgotten is that, starting from very low levels of income and development,
there is very little equity, and a large fraction of investment must therefore be financed through
other channels.
greening” the loans, lending additional funds to the borrowers to enable
them to make interest payments. Hence, actual NPLs were building up in
the banking system, although it is probable that it was thought that the de-
cline in profits was temporary.
There is another aspect of Korean growth that is important in under-
standing the background to the crisis. That is, when rapid growth started in
the early 1960s, the Korean saving rate was very low, and even negative by
some estimates. With more rapid growth, domestic saving began growing
rapidly, rising from around zero percent of GDP57 in 1960 to 15 percent of
GDP by 1970 and 25 percent of GDP by 1980. However, in the early years
and until the late 1970s, profitable investment opportunities greatly ex-
ceeded domestic savings. As a result, domestic savings were supplemented
by borrowing from abroad, equaling as much as 10 percent of GDP in years
during the 1960s.58
The Korean government guaranteed loans and determined the maximum
that could be borrowed, allocating borrowing rights among exporting
firms. Because the foreign interest rate was well below the domestic interest
rate (especially in the curb market) and the real exchange rate fairly stable
for exporters, there was intense competition for foreign loans.
As domestic saving rose, the proportionate reliance on foreign resources
for supplementing domestic saving to finance investment fell. By the 1980s,
the domestic saving rate was in excess of 30 percent, and the current ac-
count went into surplus for several years in the mid-1980s.59 Beginning at
this time, the American government in bilateral trade negotiations began to
pressure the Koreans to let the won appreciate in order to reduce the bilat-
eral trade deficit with the United States.60 Most Korean economists believed
by the mid-1990s that it would be in Korea’s best interests to have some real
depreciation of the won, but the pressures not to do so prevented it. The
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57. In 1960, it is estimated that private saving was a positive 3.2 percent of GDP, whereas
government saving was a negative 2 percent of GDP. Foreign sources financed 78 percent of
investment, which was 10 percent of GDP. See Krueger (1979, 206–07). In 1960, most foreign
resources were foreign aid.
58. Most of the capital inflow was from the private sector—largely commercial bank lend-
ing—by the late 1960s. Foreign aid had peaked in 1958 and was less than 2 percent of GDP by
the mid-1960s. The current account deficit was sustainable because of the profitability of in-
vestment and the declining debt-service ratio that resulted from such rapid growth of exports
and of real GDP.
59. Korean policymakers viewed the emergence of the current account surplus as a transi-
tory phenomenon explicable by “three blessings”: the fall in oil prices in the mid-1980s, the
drop in world interest rates (so that debt-servicing costs declined), and the boom in Korea’s
trading partners, especially Japan. The current account turned positive in 1986, rose to a peak
of 8.0 percent of GDP in 1988, fell to 2.4 percent of GDP in 1989, turned negative (–0.8 per-
cent) in 1990, and remained negative in the 1–2 percent range until 1997, when the deficit in-
creased to 4.7 percent of GDP.
60. Korea was running a bilateral surplus with the United States and a bilateral deficit with
Japan, and policymakers resisted as far as they could these pressures. One response was to ask
the American authorities whether they should devalue with respect to the yen while they ap-
preciated with respect to the U.S. dollar!
won exchange rate was not fixed, the range within which it fluctuated was
relatively narrow: it appreciated from 890 won per dollar at the end of 1985
to 679 won per dollar in 1989, and thereafter it gradually depreciated to 808
won per dollar in 1993, appreciating again to 788 won per dollar in 1995. At
the end of 1996 it stood at 844 won per dollar, and of course it depreciated
almost 50 percent in 1997.61 Thus, for the decade prior to the 1997 crisis,
there had been little change in the real exchange rate.62
Events Prior to the Crisis
Thus, by the mid-1990s, Korea had sustained thirty-five years of rapid
growth. Although there had been periods of diﬃculty—both slowdowns
and overheating—Korean policymakers had met their challenges success-
fully. As noted by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Devel-
opment (OECD), the country had come from being one of the poorest de-
veloping countries in 1960 to having a per capita income equal to that of
some OECD countries, with a higher rate of economic growth.63
The late 1980s had witnessed the introduction of a democratic process
into Korea. The elected governments chose to liberalize further, including
especially the financial sector and international capital flows.64 In 1992–93
there was a “growth recession,” as the growth rate slowed to just over 5 per-
cent (contrasted with rates of over 9 percent in the preceding two years and
an average rate above 8 percent in the preceding decade). One response was
to ease monetary policy: domestic credit expanded by over 18 percent in
1994, 14 percent in 1995, and 21 percent in 1996.65 Real GDP growth re-
sponded, exceeding 8 percent in 1994 and 1995.
However, there is ample evidence that, despite this cyclical recovery, the
profitability of the chaebol was declining and the condition of the banks was
deteriorating. Turning first to the chaebol, data for the thirty largest ones in-
dicate that the return on assets, which stood at only 2.0 percent in 1994 and
2.5 percent in 1995, fell further to 0.8 percent in 1996 and was a negative 0.7
percent in 1997. Return on equity fell from 6.9 and 8.7 percent to 2.7 and
minus 2.9 percent over the same years, while the rate of growth of operating
income was minus 14.4 percent in 1996 (Hahm and Mishkin 1999, 60).
Even during the cyclical boom years of 1994 and 1995, the financial in-
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61. Exchange rates, saving rates, and current account deficit data are all taken from various
issues of the IMF’s International Financial Statistics unless otherwise noted.
62. This may be somewhat misleading. The late 1980s was a time of the “three blessings”
(low international interest rates, low oil prices, and a favorable international economy, espe-
cially Japan) for Korea.
63. For an account of the Korean economy in the mid-1990s reflecting this consensus view,
see OECD (1994).
64. See the OECD (1994) description of the five-year financial liberalization plan.
65. This rate was not markedly faster, however, than it had been over the entire preceding
decade. Hahm and Mishkin (1999, 21) reject the notion that liberalization of the capital ac-
count was responsible for the increase in domestic credit, but they note that it did play a role
in permitting the banks to take on greater exposures to foreign exchange risk.
stitutions were borrowing abroad to finance their lending to the corporate
sector (especially the chaebol). As a consequence of financial liberalization,
twenty-four finance companies were transformed into merchant banks,
which enabled them to enter into foreign exchange transactions. Thus, both
the banks and the nonbank financial institutions increased their exposure
heavily, and much of the onlending consisted of dollar-denominated obli-
gations. According to Bank of Korea data reported in Hahm and Mishkin
(62), foreign currency debt constituted 9.8 percent of total corporate debt
in 1992, rising to 11.5 percent in 1996 and 16.4 percent in 1997. However,
corporate debt itself rose from about 130 percent of GDP in 1991 to 150
percent in 1996 and 175 percent in 1997.
There were other signs that growth was not as solidly based as it had
been. The incremental capital-output ratio, which had stayed around 4 for
many years, had risen to 5 (often deemed to be the highest sound number)
in 1991 and then rose to 6 and stayed fairly steady at that level until the
crisis.
In 1996, the dollar value of exports of goods rose only 4 percent, con-
trasted with increases of 15 and 32 percent in the preceding two years. This
very low rate reflected largely the faltering sales of semiconductors and the
turnaround in the fortunes of Samsung: the terms of trade turned sharply
against it, as the unit price of semiconductor chips fell by 70 percent, lead-
ing to a marked deterioration in Korea’s terms of trade—about 13 percent
based on unit value statistics.
External liabilities in foreign currency rose by 32 percent in 1994, 35 per-
cent in 1995, and 37 percent in 1996. Of that total, short-term liabilities
were 56 percent; these short-term liabilities were 2.79 times foreign ex-
change reserves at the end of 1996. The ratio of gross external liabilities to
GDP (including the oﬀshore borrowings of Korean banks and the overseas
borrowings of their overseas branches) had risen from 0.20 in 1992 to 0.31
by the end of 1996.66
Hence, a close examination of the data on the Korean economy would
have revealed that the economy’s financial fundamentals had deteriorated
quite substantially during the 1990s, especially if the short-term impact of
the 1994–95 cyclical recovery was discounted. The macroeconomic aggre-
gates, however, appeared fairly sound. The fiscal accounts were in balance,
and, indeed, there had been fiscal surpluses equivalent to one-half of one
percent of GDP or less in each year from 1993 through 1996. The current
account deficit had, of course, increased sharply, as already noted, from
1.74 percent of GDP in 1995 to 4.42 percent of GDP in 1996. However, if
the real exchange rate was examined only in the 1990s, it appeared to have
remained fairly stable; the inflation rate was less than 5 percent per annum,
and the saving rate was well over 30 percent. Moreover, as will be explored
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66. Data are from Hahm and Mishkin (1999), table 2.
in more detail below, the condition of the banks was probably considerably
weaker than the oﬃcial numbers indicated.
The Crisis
A number of events took place early in 1997 that surely eroded confi-
dence. One of the large chaebol, Hanbo, went bankrupt early in the year.
Given that it had been widely believed that the large chaebol were “too big
to fail,” this in and of itself must have resulted in some loss of confidence
and a reexamination of Korea’s creditworthiness. Moreover, 1997 was an
election year, with the presidential elections set to be held early in Decem-
ber. That the market anticipated diﬃculties is reflected in the fact that the
Korean stock exchange index fell from 981 in April 1996 to 677 by the end
of March 1997 and to 471 at the end of October, even before the outbreak
of the currency crisis.
However, although the net and gross foreign (and especially short-term)
liabilities of the banking and financial systems were continuing to increase,
there was no visible evidence of crisis until the final quarter of the year. The
Thai crisis had exploded in June, and the Indonesian crisis had begun dur-
ing the summer of 1997, but most observers were confident, given Korea’s
past history, that Korea would not be aﬀected.67 Korea’s oﬀshore banks
were holding paper from Indonesia, Russia, and other countries with dol-
lar liabilities, which would further deteriorate the net foreign asset position,
but that was not widely known at the time.
However, capital flight began early in the fourth quarter of the year. In
many instances, it was simply a refusal to roll over short-term debt. How-
ever, other factors contributed: Korea’s sovereign risk status was down-
graded by Standard & Poor’s in October; NPLs in the banking system dou-
bled from the end of 1996 to fourth quarter 1997, reaching 7.5 percent of
GDP by that time, owing largely to the bankruptcy of six chaebol and the
sharp drop in the Korean stock exchange. However, once it became known
that reserves were decreasing, others sought to get out of won, and the cap-
ital outflow intensified rapidly.68 Total reserves less overseas branch de-
posits and other unusable foreign exchange were $22.3 billion at the end of
October and had fallen to $7.3 billion by the end of November.69 It is re-
ported that, by the time the IMF was approached, gross reserves were being
depleted at a rate so rapid that they would have approached zero within
forty-eight hours. In the program presented to the IMF board, it was re-
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67. The author was at a conference of Korean economic policymakers in August 1997 and
the mood was one of deep gloom. Many of the participants were extremely pessimistic about
the chaebol, the state of the financial system, and the potential for reforms of economic policy.
68. However, even in November, the finance ministry was issuing reassuring statements, and
private forecasters were minimizing the likelihood that Korea would approach the IMF. For a
representative account, see John Burton’s “Korean Currency Slide Shakes Economy,” in the
Financial Times, 12 November 1997, 5.
69. Data are from Hahm and Mishkin (1999), table 11.
ported that usable reserves had dropped from $22.5 billion on October 31
to $13 billion on November 21 and $6 billion on December 2.70
The IMF Program
All three presidential candidates had declared repeatedly that under no
circumstances would they approach the IMF. When the government did ap-
proach the IMF, the IMF’s problem was complicated by several things: (a) it
was not known who the new president would be and hence with whom the
IMF would have to deal on the economics team; (b) there was very little
time to put together a program, and, both because Korea had been viewed
as sound until recently and because the candidates had all said they would
not approach the Fund, there had been less preliminary work done than
was usually the case;71 (c) the exchange rate was depreciating sharply after
the end of October, and when the band was widened to 10 percent on No-
vember 19, the rate of depreciation began accelerating rapidly; and (d) as
already mentioned, the government was rapidly running out of foreign ex-
change reserves and would soon be forced to default on its obligations (see
Boughton 1999). The high short-term indebtedness meant that foreigners
could get out of won simply by refusing to roll over outstanding debt.72
The initial program was negotiated over the period November 26 to De-
cember 3. As stated in the memorandum to the executive directors as the
staﬀ sought approval of the program, “Owing to the critical situation in Ko-
rea, and the very short period in which program negotiations had to be
completed, it was not possible to fully specify the program. Therefore, em-
phasis was placed on strong prior actions to demonstrate the government’s
seriousness to strictly implement its policy commitments.” Even as the pro-
gram was approved in December, the board was told that it would be re-
viewed in January 1998 (when, among other things, the new president and
economics team would be known).
The initial program set forth as its objectives “building the conditions for
an early return of confidence so as to limit the deceleration of real GDP
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70. Other factors also contributed. A financial reform bill, proposed by a blue ribbon com-
mittee, had been turned down by parliament, and it was not clear whether the government had
legally guaranteed the foreign exchange liabilities of the financial institutions. Although inter-
est rates had risen by about 200 basis points, the Bank of Korea was nonetheless injecting liq-
uidity into the system, which reversed the increase.
71. The fact that the Thai and Indonesian crises had already occurred no doubt diverted
some of the attention that Korea otherwise might have received. At that time, too, it must have
been anticipated that there would be Malaysian and Philippine programs.
72. Hahm and Mishkin (1999) point out that “the speculative attack was not in the usual
form of direct currency attack to exploit expected depreciation. Due to the tight regulation on
currency forwards which should be backed by corresponding current account transactions and
the absence of currency futures markets inside Korea at the time, opportunities for direct spec-
ulative attack had been much limited. Rather, the drastic depreciation of Korean won was
driven by foreign creditors’ run on Korean financial institutions and chaebols to collect their
loans, and by foreign investors to exit from the Korean stock market” (25).
growth to about 3 percent of GDP in 1998, followed by a recovery towards
potential in 1999; containing inflation at or below 5 percent; and building
international reserves to more than two months of imports by end-1998”
(IMF 1997). The staﬀ memorandum stated that there were three pillars to
the government’s program: the macroeconomic framework;73 restructuring
and recapitalizing the financial sector, and reducing the reliance of corpo-
rations and financial institutions on short-term debt.
The 5 percent inflation target looked ambitious in light of the large de-
preciation of the won (from the mid-800s per dollar to almost 1,800 per U.S.
dollar at its peak) and the share of traded goods in GDP.74 To achieve that
objective, the liquidity that had been introduced into the system in prior
weeks (in an eﬀort to support the chaebol ) was removed, and money mar-
ket rates were raised sharply. In the words of the staﬀ, these rates would “be
maintained at as high a level as needed to stabilize markets” (5). Day-to-day
monetary policy was to be geared to exchange rate and short-term interest
rate movements, and exchange rate policy was to be flexible with interven-
tion “limited to smoothing operations.”
The 1998 budget as passed by the government had projected a surplus of
about 0.25 percent of GDP. However, Fund staﬀ estimated that lower
growth and the altered exchange rate would reduce the balance by 0.8 per-
cent of GDP and that it would require 5.5 percent of GDP to recapitalize
the banks to meet the Basel minimum capital standards. It was assumed
that these funds would have to be borrowed, and interest costs (0.8 percent
of GDP) were therefore also included in the altered budget estimates. These
factors would, on IMF estimates, have shifted the fiscal account into deficit
to about 1.5 percent of GDP in 1998. As stated by staﬀ, “In order to pre-
vent such a deficit and alleviate the burden on monetary policy in the over-
all macroeconomic adjustment, fiscal policy will be tightened to achieve at
least balance and, preferably, a small surplus.” The program therefore called
for fiscal changes approximately oﬀsetting the negative anticipated changes
and thus for maintenance of the fiscal stance as anticipated prior to the cri-
sis, with the 1.5 percent of GDP cuts equally distributed between govern-
ment expenditures and revenues. The government initially raised some
taxes to yield about 0.5 percent of GDP.
The second leg of the program was financial restructuring. As already in-
dicated, NPLs were large and increasing prior to the crisis. The deprecia-
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73. Much of the controversy surrounding the Korean program centers on whether the pro-
gram tightened fiscal policy too much. This is discussed below. It should be noted that the IMF
staﬀ’s introduction of the macroeconomic program indicated that the program would involve
“a tighter monetary stance and significant fiscal adjustment” (5).
74. As stated in the Request for Standby, “The inflation target reflects a very limited pass-
through of the recent depreciation of the won to the aggregate price level. . . . In order to
achieve the inflation objective, the government will aim to reduce broad money growth (M3)
from an estimated 16.4 percent at end-September to 15.4 percent at end-December 1997, and
to a rate consistent with the inflation objective in 1998” (5–6).
tion of the exchange rate increased debt-servicing obligations for chaebol
and financial institutions, as did the increase in interest rates that came
about with monetary tightening. The details of financial restructuring are
intricate enough that they cannot be delved into here in any detail. Suﬃce
it to say that an exit policy was to be adopted to close down weak financial
institutions, recapitalizing the remaining banks (through mergers or other
means). A deposit guarantee was to be phased out at the end of December
2000 and replaced with deposit insurance for small depositors only. Trans-
parency was to be increased in a variety of ways. Large firms were to be au-
dited by international accounting houses. Supervisory functions were to be
reorganized, the Bank of Korea given much greater independence, and so
on. Finally, the government undertook to withdraw from any influence over
lending decisions, leaving those to the financial institutions.
One important point to note in terms of bank restructuring is that it re-
quired a prior, or at least concurrent, restructuring of the chaebol finances.
Given their very high debt-equity ratios75 (for one chaebol at the height of
the crisis, the debt-equity ratio reached 12:1), financial viability, where fea-
sible at all, would surely require swaps of debt by the chaebol to the banks,
giving the banks equity in return.
The IMF standby also called for the Korean government to set a time-
table to meet its World Trade Organization (WTO) trade-related commit-
ments to remove restrictive import licensing and “diversification program”
(which discriminated against Japanese imports). Equally, the program stip-
ulated further capital account liberalization including, importantly, in-
creasing the ceiling on aggregate foreign ownership of Korean shares from
26 to 50 percent by the end of 1997 and then to 55 percent by the end of
1998.76 Remaining elements of capital account liberalization, which had al-
ready been agreed to with the OECD, were to be accelerated with the new
program announced by the end of February 1998. In addition, restrictions
on direct foreign borrowing by chaebol were to be eliminated. The first of
these measures—permitting increased foreign ownership—encouraged
foreign investment and enabled the possibility of foreign control of finan-
cial institutions, among other things.
The standby then addressed corporate governance and corporate finan-
cial structure issues, noting that the only scrutiny over chaebol investments,
even of large scale, had been by bank managers “whose appointment has
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75. These high debt-equity ratios were public knowledge. The Financial Times published
data on debt-equity ratios for twenty chaebol on 8 August 1997. The highest was Sammi, with
33.3 times as much debt as equity; Jinro had 85 times as much debt as equity and Halla 20
times; Hyundai’s debt was 4.4 times its equity, and so on. Profits were relatively small as a per-
centage of assets or sales. In Samsung’s case, for example, net profits were 179.5 billion won on
sales of 60 trillion won and total assets of 51 trillion won. Nine of the twenty chaebol listed in
the Financial Times on that day had taken losses.
76. This measure—which some have criticized as being beyond the Fund’s mandate—en-
abled a more rapid recapitalization of the banks than would otherwise have been possible.
traditionally been influenced by the government.” It then anticipated that
shareholders’ and directors’ oversight should improve, especially in con-
junction with increased opportunity for foreign purchases of shares. One
important element of these changes was to be the reform of bankruptcy
laws, with governmental agreement that there would in future be no finan-
cial support, forced mergers, or tax privileges for individual firms.
The final components of the standby were those related to data provision
and monitoring, which need not be of concern here. The staﬀ then ad-
dressed the issue of the reasons for external support. It first noted that the
current account deficit was expected to decline markedly in 1997 to about 3
percent of GDP, and then—with export growth and won depreciation—to
about 0.5 percent of GDP in 1998. However, the very high level of short-
term debt was seen to be worrisome. As stated in the standby, “It is diﬃcult
to estimate with any certainty the likely developments in capital flows . . . ,
given the uncertainty surrounding the rolling over of private sector short-
term debt and the recent collapse in market confidence. . . . The working as-
sumption is that, on the basis of the beneficial eﬀects on market confi-
dence. . . . The working assumption is that, on the basis of the beneficial
eﬀects on market confidence of the announced program and the large fi-
nancing package, the bulk of the short-term debt will be rolled over. Under
this scenario, the purpose of the exceptional financing would be largely to
reconstitute reserves. For this outcome to materialize, it is critical that the
financing package provided is adequately large and the program is per-
ceived to be strong. . . . It is anticipated that a comprehensive financing
package of about $55 billion will be provided on a multilateral and bilateral
basis . . .”(12).
Aftermath of the Crisis
For at least two weeks after the announcement of the IMF program,
questions remained as to whether the downward slide had been halted.77 By
late December, however, the exchange rate had stabilized, and by mid-
January, foreign banks announced a $24 billion package of rollovers and
new money (Financial Times, 30 January 1998, 11).
Domestic economic activity slowed markedly in 1998. For the year as a
whole, real GDP fell by 5.8 percent, contrasted with the Fund’s projected 3
percent. The unemployment rate, which had been 2.2 percent at the end of
the third quarter of 1997, rose throughout 1998 and peaked in the first quar-
ter of 1999 at 8.4 percent. The seasonally adjusted industrial production in-
dex fell by 15 percent from the end of 1997 to the second quarter of 1998.
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77. Because of this, it is very diﬃcult to accept the argument that the Fund program was “too
stringent.” Indeed, given those uncertainties, it is more plausible to argue that the program
might have been even more restrictive initially.
Thereafter, it rose, reaching its precrisis level by the end of 1998 and 144.9
at the end of 1999.
The external accounts improved markedly. There was a sharp drop in im-
ports in immediate response to the crisis, and a much-increased current ac-
count balance: whereas exports were slightly lower in dollar terms in 1998
than in 1997, imports fell 22.4 percent and the current account balance was
equal to an astonishing 12.5 percent of GDP for the year. Foreign exchange
reserves rose in response, reaching $74 billion by the end of 1999 and $83.5
billion by the end of the first quarter of 2000. The decline in real GDP ended
in mid-1998, and by the end of the year, real GDP had exceeded its precri-
sis level. For 1999, real GDP growth exceeded 9 percent, and it was pro-
jected to attain that same rate for 2000.
After early 1998, the nominal exchange rate appreciated in dollar terms,
entering the year 2000 at around 1,100 to the dollar, as contrasted with
1,800 to the dollar at the peak of the crisis. Moreover, prices at the end of
1998 were about 7 percent higher than at the end of 1997; in 1999 the rate
of inflation was just 0.8 percent, as measured by the consumer price index.
Progress in restructuring the financial sector was necessarily consider-
ably slower. Although interest rates had fallen below their precrisis levels
by the end of 1999, restructuring of chaebol and financial institutions met
considerable resistance.78 Government policy pronouncements and ac-
tions have continued to push reforms, but the pace of reform has been
much slower than with regard to the balance of payments and external fi-
nances.
By early 2000, it was certainly the case that the Korean recovery had been
more rapid and more pronounced than had been anticipated by any. Al-
though there was an underlying question as to whether the financial re-
forms had been eﬀected in ways that would enable further financial devel-
opment on a sound basis, there was no doubt that recovery had come, and
come dramatically. Korea was regarded as the most successful country in
pulling out of the crisis.
After the initial program of 3 December 1997, there were LOIs dated 24
December 1997, 7 February 1998, 2 May 1998, 24 July 1998, 9 December
1998, 10 March 1999, 2 November 1999, and 12 July 2000.79 In each, targets
were revised and the program was amended as judged appropriate. In gen-
eral, the fiscal deficits achieved—especially in 1998—were smaller in mag-
nitude than target, whereas foreign exchange reserves exceeded target. By
1999, fiscal objectives were once again to reduce the budget deficit as the re-
covery accelerated more rapidly than had been anticipated. The 12 July
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78. See, for example, “Boxed into a Corner,” by John Burton (Financial Times, 23 Novem-
ber 1998, 17), whose header read “South Korea’s chaebol are fighting a stiﬀ rearguard action
against government reforms but the conglomerates are being forced to change their ways.”
79. These are all available on the IMF’s website: [http://www.imf.org/external/np].
2000 LOI was the final review under the standby, which was set to expire 3
December 2000.
How Good Was the Fund’s Program?
There are three key issues on which the Fund has been criticized with re-
spect to the Korean program after the East Asian financial crisis. The first
pertains to the degree of monetary and fiscal tightening that accompanied
the onset of the program, and the second is the extent to which issues such
as corporate governance needed to be a part of the program.80 The third is
the size of the loan package, although on that issue there are criticisms both
that it was too small and that it was too large.
Turning to the degree of monetary and fiscal tightening that took place,
Stiglitz has been perhaps the foremost spokesman for the view that tight-
ening interest rates may in fact have been counterproductive during the cri-
sis phase. As was seen in section 4.1.3, there is a trade-oﬀ between tighten-
ing the money supply and letting the exchange rate depreciate more, and
both of these measures have their dangers.81 Given the rate at which reserves
were dwindling and the exchange rate depreciating in November and early
December 1997, it seems absolutely clear that monetary tightening had to
take place. Its extent had to be such that a strong signal was provided (es-
pecially in light of the elections and the new government) that the govern-
ment was serious about addressing the situation. Indeed, judging by the
continued slide of the won in the first two weeks after announcement of the
IMF program, a case could even be made that perhaps monetary policy
should have been even tighter!82 Certainly, with respect to monetary policy,
it seems evident that it was at the very beginning none too tight. One might
question the rate at which it eased in 1998 once the exchange market had
stabilized and the severity of the downturn in domestic economic activity
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80. For criticisms of the Fund with respect to the monetary and fiscal tightening, see Jeﬀrey
Sachs, “The Wrong Medicine for Asia,” (New York Times, 3 November 1997) and Furman and
Stiglitz (1998); for criticisms of the Fund with respect to the breadth of coverage of the pro-
gram, see Feldstein (1998).
81. Stiglitz has argued that interest rate increases may have increased the degree of exchange
rate depreciation and financial instability because only riskier investments would be under-
taken at higher interest rates or borrowers had more diﬃculty servicing their debts. Tests of
this hypothesis provide strong evidence that this was not the case in Korea. Cho and West
(1999) tested the relationship between interest rates and exchange rates in Korea over the pe-
riod December 1997 to mid-1999 and found that “the high interest rate policy after the crisis
contributed to stabilizing the exchange rate in the short run.” However, they found the recov-
ery of the foreign currency liquidity position the longer-run determinant of the exchange rate.
However, recovery in reserves came about because of the turnaround in the current account
balance, itself a function both of the IMF loan and of the exchange rate.
82. See Financial Times, 12 December 1997, 17. John Burton, in “This is an Unusual Situa-
tion,” wrote that “In the week since it signed up . . . , South Korea has seen its currency drop
by nearly 30 percent against the dollar. Corporate bond yields are up nearly 5 percentage
points to 23 percent, and the country’s banks and companies seem as much in danger as ever
of defaulting. . . . As the won dropped another 10 percent within four minutes of opening yes-
terday, some people began to fear that there might be a meltdown in financial markets.”
became evident, but the criticism of the initial part of the program in that
regard seems inappropriate.
Fiscal policy can, however, be questioned. As seen above, the first pro-
gram took into account the impact on government expenditures of the sta-
bilization program; although expenditures were to be reduced and taxes
raised, these were intended to oﬀset other increases in expenditure (e.g.,
larger interest payments at higher interest rates) and lower revenues (be-
cause of anticipated recession). There is no doubt that the first LOI did un-
derestimate the extent of the downturn, anticipating 3 percent in contrast
with the actual reduction of more than 5 percent of GDP. However, adjust-
ments were made in subsequent reviews and LOIs. For example, the Sep-
tember 1998 original target was for a central government fiscal deficit of 7
trillion won; the revised target was 10 trillion won; the actual deficit for that
period was 5.7 trillion won. Even for the March 1999 quarter, the target
deficit was 23.5 trillion won and that achieved was 19.7 trillion won. Hence,
although there can be questions about whether the original fiscal targets
were too tight, subsequent IMF missions certainly assented to easier tar-
gets, and the actuals were smaller than the target deficits for most of the re-
cession and recovery period.83
The second criticism—that the programs interfered more in internal eco-
nomic policies than was necessary—is more diﬃcult to evaluate. On one
hand, financial restructuring was absolutely essential, first as a very credi-
ble intent, or capital outflows would have continued, and second as a pre-
requisite for economic recovery. Moreover, because the devaluation and
higher interest rates would both weaken the financial sector in the short run
(and this would be understood by the markets), failure to address the issue
would clearly have increased the severity of the recession and delayed, if not
aborted, the recovery. And financial restructuring could not be satisfacto-
rily undertaken without addressing the very high debt-equity ratios of the
chaebol, which immediately led into issues of corporate governance, super-
vision, and the like.
There is no doubt that financial restructuring is inherently domestic and
politically diﬃcult because it entails sorting out property rights among
claimants and, perhaps even more important, allocating the losses among
various groups—at least between shareholders, borrowers, and taxpayers.
Were there an international institution or organization (such as the Bank
for International Settlements [BIS]) that supported financial restructuring
eﬀorts, there would of necessity have to be close coordination between that
agency and the IMF when twin crises arose. In the absence of such an
agency, however, it would appear that the IMF cannot credibly support a
IMF Stabilization Programs 333
83. I have not been able to ascertain the extent to which this shortfall from deficit targets was
the result of more rapid expansion of GDP than anticipated and the extent to which there were
other factors.
stabilization program without being assured that appropriate financial re-
structuring will take place.
These issues would be much less pressing if countries’ governments, fi-
nancial institutions, and corporations did not take uncovered debtor posi-
tions in foreign exchange. However, as long as these positions are taken84
and financial institutions are already weak at the outset of a crisis because
of NPLs, financial restructuring will often be an essential part of stabiliza-
tion programs.85 Although improved incentives for financial institutions to
manage risk appropriately and appropriate strengthening of prudential su-
pervision would significantly reduce the incidence of twin crises, address-
ing these issues when they do arise is unavoidable.
There are also questions as to whether financial restructuring has gone
far enough. As already mentioned, the Korean government has encoun-
tered major political resistance to eﬀorts to restructure the finances of the
chaebol and to attain arms’-length transactions between the chaebol and the
financial institutions. The question, however, would be whether the inter-
national community should be more insistent upon rapid restructuring than
it was; to the extent one can criticize the evolution of economic policy in Ko-
rea since the crisis, that criticism would be with respect to the slowness with
which financial restructuring has occurred.86
The third issue (for all the Asian programs) was whether forthcoming
support from the IMF and the other bilateral and multilateral institutions
was of the appropriate size. Some argue that the financing should have been
larger, at least enough to cover outstanding short-term indebtedness, and
should have been available without conditions. To this proposal there are
several responses. First, if a country does not adjust its policies, it is likely
that capital outflows will continue, and capital flows are not limited to
short-term debt. A larger size of program would then only result in larger
capital outflows. A larger volume of foreign financial resources coupled
with a smaller adjustment package would likely result in a greater capital
outflow, and hence be self-defeating.
The other criticism—that the financial support should have been
smaller—is based both on the outcome (not all resources were used) and
on the proposition that there is moral hazard involved in IMF lending. Al-
though there is no doubt moral hazard, those top policymakers who were
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84. Hahm and Mishkin (1999) estimate that more than 60 percent of the foreign currency
obligations were uncovered at the time of the crisis.
85. This is vividly illustrated by the contrast between Brazil’s crisis in the early months of
1998 and the Asian crises. In Brazil, the financial system had few NPLs when the real was al-
lowed to depreciate, and there appear to have been few foreign currency–denominated liabili-
ties. The Brazilian recession was both short and shallow, and recovery was remarkably rapid,
surprising most observers.
86. A great deal of the focus in the 12 July 2000 LOI, which is the last one, is on issues per-
taining to further financial restructuring, including the need for reform of investment trusts
and the corporate sector.
in oﬃce in the run-up to the crisis in Korea (as well as in Thailand, Mexico,
Brazil, and Indonesia) lost their jobs very quickly in any event. Certainly,
the risk to top economics oﬃcials must serve as at least a partial oﬀset to
moral hazard that would otherwise be entailed in their willingness to bor-
row and risk crises. Moreover, as noted, given conditions at the time of the
IMF loan, it seems evident that the financial package should have been
more than a “minimum” in order to reduce or eliminate expectations of a
further free-fall of the exchange rate or of a financial crisis.
On most criteria, therefore, one can evaluate the IMF programs in Korea
as having been successful: hindsight enables a clearer focus on the factors
that contributed to the rapid emergence of the crisis,87 and there are lessons
for economic policy management for crisis avoidance, as well as areas where
one can be critical at the margin of the stabilization program, but on bal-
ance, Koreans and the rest of the world are better oﬀ because of the fund’s
activities during the very diﬃcult crisis period and its aftermath.
The Indonesian Crisis
The Korean stabilization program is of course of interest in itself; it is also
of interest in analyzing the components of a Fund stabilization program
and the reasons for them in light of conditions at the beginning of the crisis.
By contrast, the Indonesian case is of more interest in understanding how
political conditions or decisions can thwart an IMF program. I therefore
very briefly sketch the background to the Indonesian crisis and the original
Fund program, focusing instead on the factors that contributed to Indone-
sia’s relatively poor performance after the initial crisis and Fund program.
Background
Indonesia had also experienced rapid growth over the preceding several
decades, averaging about 7 percent annually. Indonesia started as a very
populous (with little arable land per farmer and a large population, cur-
rently over 200 million) and poor country, but living standards and other
indicators of well-being had risen markedly for most of the population,
including that majority who were employed in agriculture. Indonesia’s
growth diﬀered from that of the East Asian “tigers,” however, in a number
of respects. Growth of industry was spurred to a large extent by the internal
market and had not been accompanied by a rapid growth of new manufac-
turing activity destined for exports; indeed, foreign exchange earnings to
support growth originated largely in primary commodities—oil exports
had accounted for more than half of foreign exchange earnings until the
mid-1980s, when the price of oil fell sharply; agricultural commodity ex-
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87. One can also raise issues about the incentives for foreign lending to emerging markets
and ways that there might be incentives for a better balance between diﬀerent forms of capital
inflow.
ports were also important. Protection against foreign imports had re-
mained relatively high, and many new projects (such as a national car plant;
there were even plans to expand the uneconomic airplane factory to pro-
duce jets) were anticipated as import substitution ventures. Many viewed
the Indonesian policymakers as schizophrenic between reliance on markets
(and therefore presumably on growth of exports of industries with large in-
puts of unskilled labor) and retaining governmental controls and ownership
over industry in order to develop high-technology import-substitution in-
dustries.88
Nonetheless, growth of agricultural output and productivity had been
quite rapid, and rural standards of living, literacy rates, and health and nu-
trition indicators had risen significantly. The fraction of people living below
the poverty line had been greatly reduced.
Hence, Indonesia was regarded as an economic success story, although
visibility in the international economy was well below that of the East Asian
tigers with their reliance upon manufactured exports and development of
international markets for their output. Key diﬀerences were that living stan-
dards remained much lower than in East Asia, and politics were more sus-
pect, especially after Korea moved toward more representative government
in the mid-1980s, with Taiwan following suit.
President Sukarno, the independence leader and national hero, was in
oﬃce until 1966. During his presidency, inflation had reached the thou-
sands of percentage points annually, exports had dropped dramatically, and
living standards had clearly not risen, although statistics were sparse and
unreliable.
In 1966, Sukarno was overthrown in a bloody revolution,89 and a general,
Suharto, took power. He remained in oﬃce until early 1998. During his
tenure, economic growth was rapid, as was already mentioned, and the In-
donesian government was generally regarded as having done well in its eco-
nomic policies, both for growth and for poverty alleviation. However, it was
also widely recognized that President Suharto was the country’s ruler, that
his friends and cronies were benefiting enormously from the regime,90 and
that opposition was not tolerated. As his tenure in oﬃce got longer and as
he aged, the regime appeared increasingly oppressive, and questions about
succession were more pressing.91
336 Anne O. Krueger
88. See, for example, Wall Street Journal, 25 March 1993, A8: “Economic Roads: Indonesia
is Divided on Whether to Compete on Low Labor Costs or Try High Tech.”
89. The extreme violence in 1966 is one of the bases for nervousness about political instabil-
ity in Indonesia.
90. See The Economist, 17 November 1990, 37. The subheading for the article read “The
world’s fifth most populous country may be on its way to producing another of those famous
Asian economic miracles. Will politics ruin it?”
91. I was at a luncheon of bankers in Melbourne when the Indonesian rupiah was depreciat-
ing sharply. The Indonesian economy was the subject of discussion. One of the bankers present
commented that he traveled all over the world for his bank and that he had visited Indonesia the
preceding July. It was, he reported, the only country he had visited on business in which the first
thing he heard about was the evacuation plans in the event of a political uprising.
The early 1990s were years of relatively successful growth: real GDP con-
tinued to grow at rates between 6 and 8 percent annually, inflation remained
around 5 percent annually, and the government fiscal accounts were show-
ing a small surplus. There were, however, a few worrisome signs. The cur-
rent account deficit widened substantially from the $2 to $3 billion dollar
range of the early 1990s to $6.4 billion in 1995, $7.3 billion in 1996, and $4.9
billion in 1997. Moreover, Indonesia’s short-term debt had risen from $18
billion in 1992 and 1993 to $36 billion in 1997, while international reserves,
which had equaled short-term debt in 1993, were only $20.3 billion at the
end of 1997. The proximate source of this deterioration was a very rapid
growth of domestic credit, which had increased by 21–22 percent in every
year after 1993, and which then rose by 25 percent in 1997. It was well, but
not oﬃcially, known that much bank credit was destined for the relatives
and friends of the president and that many loans were on nonperforming
status, or were at best “evergreen,” in that additional credit was extended to
enable the payment of debt-servicing obligations.
An election was scheduled for early 1998, and there was considerable
speculation as to whether or not Suharto would run for another term in
oﬃce. However, in the summer of 1997, capital flight began from Indone-
sia, and the rupiah began depreciating rapidly. The exchange rate had been
2,200 Rp per U.S. dollar at the end of 1994, and 2,380 Rp per dollar at the
end of 1996. Even at the end of June 1997, it was 2,450. Then the rapid slide
began. By the end of September, it was 4,471; by the end of December 6,274,
reaching over 17,000 at its peak, and still 14,900 per dollar at the end of June
1998.
Of the various countries that were severely aﬀected by the Asian financial
crisis, it is probably Indonesia that caught people most by surprise.92 In
part, this was because of the relatively good economic performance of ear-
lier years and, probably, a belief that the economic policies underlying this
performance would continue independently of political events. Moreover,
the Indonesian rupiah did not appear to be overvalued. Four sets of esti-
mates have been made of the degree of real overvaluation of various Asian
countries as of late 1996 or early 1997. One found the rupiah to have been
undervalued, whereas the other three estimated overvaluation in the range
of 4.2 to 9.6 percent.93 Indonesia’s incremental capital-output ratio re-
mained at around 4 during the mid-1990s, while those of the other Asian
countries were rising. Finally, Indonesian exports had continued growing
reasonably rapidly—over 9 percent from the second half of 1995 to the sec-
ond half of 1996—at a time when export growth in the rest of the region (ex-
cept the Philippines) had been flagging. Hence, although observers had
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92. To be sure, there were runs on the Hong Kong stock exchange and to some extent on the
Taiwanese dollar and the Singapore dollar. In these instances, however, defenses were suc-
cessful and the impact was far smaller than in Thailand, Korea, and Indonesia.
93. Estimates for the other Asian countries also indicated little evidence of overvaluation,
with the largest estimates being for the Philippines. See Berg (1999, 8), table 2.
long recognized that Indonesia’s political situation was potentially more
volatile than that of the other rapidly growing Asian economies, there was
less short-term concern about economic indicators.
However, the Indonesian banking system appears to have been much
weaker than was generally appreciated. The oﬃcial estimate of the per-
centage of NPLs in the banking system prior to the crisis, 8.8 percent for
1996,94 was the highest in the region (Thailand’s oﬃcial estimate was 7.7
percent and Korea’s 0.8 percent). However, JPMorgan and Goldman Sachs
estimated actual NPLs as a share of total loans in 1998, and also the share
at the peak of the crisis: their estimates were 11.0 and 9.0 percent respec-
tively for Indonesia’s total NPLs in 1998, and 30 to more than 40 percent at
the peak of the crisis. These, too, were high relative even to other Asian
countries.95
The corporate debt-equity ratio was put at 200 percent by 1996, and the
estimated return on assets 4.7 percent. Thus, the financial sector was highly
vulnerable and weak prior to the attack on the currency. When that attack
came, the high ratio of short-term debt to international reserves was the
proximate cause, but the weakness of the financial system clearly intensified
it. There was no formal deposit insurance in Indonesia.96 Once the closure
of some insolvent financial institutions was announced, depositors ques-
tioned the dependability of other banks, and some fled to foreign currency
rather than to the sounder domestic banks.97
The Crisis
The Indonesian rupiah began to depreciate in mid-1997, after the onset
of the Thai crisis. Capital flight, if anything, intensified after that, even af-
ter the first IMF program was announced and begun early in November.98
A key problem was that, once the downslide began, political instability fol-
lowed. As already mentioned, there had been questions about the forth-
coming election and whether President Suharto would run again early in
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94. Data on Asian financial indicators of vulnerability prior to the crisis are from Berg
(1999, 8), table 2, which seems to be as comparable a set of estimates across countries as is avail-
able.
95. Both sources put Korea’s and Thailand’s actual NPLs in 1998 above those of Indonesia
in 1998, but Indonesia was still higher at the peak of the crisis by their estimates. It should be
noted that the estimates for the Philippines were far below those of other Asian countries,
which may explain why the Philippines was able to avoid the severe downturn that aﬀected
other Asian countries.
96. However, several banks had been closed earlier and small depositors had been compen-
sated by the government.
97. Berg (1999, 23) points out that “After the announcement of the program at the end of
October, foreign loans continued to be withdrawn. The exchange rate stayed reasonably stable
until early December, when rumors of president Suharto’s ill health . . . precipitated a sharp
decline in the rupiah. Rollover rates on external credits fell to very low levels and fears of im-
minent default intensified.”
98. The first LOI is dated 31 October 1997. All references to LOIs are referred to by dates.
They may be found at [http://www.imf.org/external/country/IND/index.htm].
1998 even before the beginning of the crisis. Indeed, as late as December, the
rupiah fell, partly due to the rumor that the president’s health had deterio-
rated and that he would not seek reelection.99 In the event, the economic
downturn led to intensified political opposition, and President Suharto
stepped down and was succeeded by one of his allies, President Habibie.
Then, after elections were held in the middle of 1998 (for Parliament), a
coalition government led by President Abdurrahman Wahid came into
oﬃce. Some of the government’s primary concerns were political,100 and the
problems of the economy seem to have been underestimated or at least not
really fully understood by the leaders of the new government.
Either way, from October 1997 onward, political considerations domi-
nated and led to considerable uncertainty as to what actions would be taken
by the relevant economic oﬃcials; even when commitments were made, it
was not apparent whether they would be carried out. This pattern started
even under President Suharto, who declared in January 1998 that he would
not necessarily follow IMF advice (despite the LOI of November). That
episode ended with the famous photo of the IMF’s managing director, arms
folded, looking on as Suharto finally signed another agreement.
This state of things led to a number of renegotiations, cancellations of old
agreements, signing of new ones, delays in approving second tranches, and
so on. There were LOIs at frequent intervals; almost all restated earlier pro-
grams or had more urgent calls for actions that had been agreed upon in
them.101 The 15 January 1998 LOI, for example, set new and looser fiscal
targets (in light of the severe deterioration of the Indonesian economy); the
LOI of 19 October 1998 enumerated a large number of targets and set new
dates for actions that had not been taken in accordance with the timetables
in previous LOIs.102 In January 2000, the earlier extended facility (of 25 Au-
gust 1998) was canceled and a new extended arrangement entered into with
the new government in place.
One of the manifestations of political instability was the apparent inabil-
ity of the government itself to agree on a course of action. Announcements
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99. Given President Suharto’s age, observers were also keenly interested in his choice for a
vice-presidential candidate, because his term of oﬃce if reelected would have been six years.
100. Chief among these was the role of the military. The president seems to have focused on
this issue and was able to reduce the influence and power of the military significantly during
the first part of 2000.
101. See Goldstein (chap. 5 in this volume) for further discussion of some of the conditions.
102. These included such items as introducing a law in Parliament to give Bank Indonesia
autonomy; earlier LOIs had targeted this for 30 September 1998; in the October LOI, it was
reported as being “in preparation.” Likewise, there had been an intent to review the portfolios
and finances of all the banks held by the Indonesian Bank Reconstruction Authority (IBRA),
which had assumed control of the banks by 30 August 1998, and it was reported that twenty-
seven banks had been reviewed, with the rest (twenty-seven) to be completed by November 15.
A commitment to remove restrictions on debt-equity conversions—essential for corporate fi-
nancial restructuring—had been made for 30 September 1998 and was reported in the LOI as
“expected soon.”
were repeatedly reversed, decisions taken were amended or not imple-
mented, and inaction appeared to rule. Even as this paper was being writ-
ten, the newly installed economy minister (who replaced his predecessor in
order to bring “leadership” to the economics team) announced his open
disagreement with the finance minister over the future of Bank Rakyat In-
donesia.103
The decline in Indonesia’s real GDP in 1998 was the severest of the crisis
countries: it is recorded to have fallen by 13.7 percent, and preliminary es-
timates indicate a further drop of 0.8 percent in 1999. This compares with
Thailand—the next hardest hit—which saw a decline in real GDP of 9.4
percent in 1998 and estimated growth in 1999 of 2.5 percent. Estimates for
real GDP growth in Indonesia in 2000 center on 2–4 percent, which would
not begin to reattain the precrisis level.
Evaluation of the Program
In an important sense, Indonesian economic growth has not resumed.
The forecast growth in 2000 is expected to originate mostly in agriculture
and other informal activities, and it reflects primarily a larger number of
people in those activities. The important question is: what has gone wrong?
In a number of regards, the Indonesian situation as of mid-1997 appears
not to have been dissimilar to that confronting Korea: each had political
uncertainty (although Korea’s election was sooner and it was quickly
resolved); each had a high ratio of short-term foreign debt to international
reserves; and each had a weak domestic banking system. Moreover, the
initial IMF responses look similar. In both instances, programs called for
financial restructuring and supporting measures for it as well as initial
tightening of monetary and fiscal policy,104 and they were implemented only
after the currency had depreciated markedly.
The first diﬀerence between Korea and Indonesia seems to lie in the im-
mediate aftermath. Neither Fund program provided (or could have pro-
vided) suﬃcient resources to enable private creditors to have been repaid:
there had to be some debt rollover in addition to the support from the in-
ternational community. In Korea’s case, rollover of private-sector debt and
the stretching-out of maturities started almost immediately with the re-
structuring of bank debt late in December, and $22 billion more was rolled
over into medium-term debt in April 1999 (see Berg 1999, 21). By contrast,
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103. Indonesian Observer, 13 September 2000. See also the editorial by Sadli, in Bulletin
Kadin, September 2000, titled “Muddling Through of Economic Recovery Continuing,
Amidst Political Uncertainties.” As this paper was being revised in November 2000, Bank In-
donesia oﬃcials were announcing that they could maintain monetary and exchange rate poli-
cies despite the resignation of many of the board members (Jakarta Post, 23 November 2000).
104. The Fund’s later review of the programs in the crisis countries defended the initial mon-
etary and fiscal stances in each country as set forth in the LOIs but recognized that relaxation
of the fiscal stance might have come sooner. See the press conference of Jack Boorman, 19 Jan-
uary 1999, [http://www.imf.org/external/np/tr/1999/tr990120.htm].
in Indonesia’s case, the capital outflow did not stop. Moreover, private firms
and banks holding foreign currency–denominated debt found themselves
with rupiah-denominated obligations increased by a considerably greater
multiple than in Korea because of the larger proportionate rupiah depreci-
ation. The already weak financial system was in imminent danger of col-
lapse.
The government of Indonesia did take over the banks and founded the
Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA) to undertake restructur-
ing. However, IBRA was very slow to commence work, and a year after its
inauguration it had done very little. Moreover, IBRA compensated banks
for the loans it assumed with nonnegotiable government bonds. Much as
some sort of takeover was probably in order, banks could not and cannot
(since they still hold them) lend nonnegotiable instruments. There was
doubt about the soundness of the banks that were still functioning; IBRA
was not recapitalizing and restructuring the banks, and the banks were not
lending. In the words of Al Harberger in December 1998, fourteen months
after the crisis had begun:
At some point in time during the early months of the crisis, the Indone-
sian commercial banks, beset by demand from their own creditors, virtu-
ally shut their “new loans” window. Their determination was to collect on
their “old loans” to the extent that these were amortized, and then to use
the proceeds either to pay their own creditors or to strengthen their very
precarious liquidity positions. The response of the commercial banks’
customers to this new policy was simply to stop making amortization
payments on their debts to the banks. Some customers continued to pay
interest, others did not. Of those debtor companies that paid neither in-
terest nor amortization, some were solvent and able to pay, simply choos-
ing not to pay under the special circumstances of the moment. Others
were truly unable to pay; their loans would be “bad loans” under any cir-
cumstances. Unfortunately it was not easy to discriminate among the
non-payers, so that one did not have a clear idea of how many of them
were in one category and how many in the other.
The situation of a wholesale “borrowers’ strike” against paying oﬀ ex-
isting loans came as something new to me. It adds new complications to
the problem of bailing out the banks, and may greatly magnify the cost
that ultimately has to be borne by the taxpayers. (Harberger 1999, 60–61)
Failure of IBRA to act more quickly and decisively and the failure of the
domestic financial system explains much of the continuing diﬃculties of In-
donesia. Those diﬃculties, in turn, are in large part a reflection of the polit-
ical situation and its uncertainties.
The question arises, therefore, as to (a) whether the Fund should have ini-
tiated a program in the first place and (b) once it had done so and the au-
thorities were moving slowly, whether it should have continued in its sup-
port. The first question is by far the easier. Clearly, the political events that
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transpired once the Indonesian crisis was under way could not have been
anticipated. The Indonesian situation was not that dissimilar to those in the
other Asian countries,105 and uncertainties appeared to be no greater, and
possibly even less, than those in Korea. Moreover, it is even conceivable that
had the Fund program worked initially as well in Indonesia as it did in Ko-
rea, the political diﬃculties that transpired during the winter of 1998 might
have been postponed, and an upturn might have taken place. Perhaps most
telling of all, however, there was, as stated by Berg, an “imminent danger”
of the complete collapse of the Indonesian financial system, and it seems a
straightforward conclusion that anything that brought about a significantly
positive probability that that eventuality would be averted was a worthwhile
proposition. Moreover, Indonesia is a suﬃciently large and strategically lo-
cated country that many of the Fund’s largest shareholders were deter-
mined that the Fund should act. If it is believed the IMF should not have
done so, criticism should be directed at the large industrial countries that in-
sisted on support for Indonesia.
The inability of the Indonesians to carry out commitments, even when
backed by Fund pressure, that were obviously essential to the resolution of
the crisis suggests that many of the secondary conditions set forth in the
LOIs were well warranted. Indeed, much of the detail included in the suc-
cessive LOIs was there precisely because steps earlier promised had not
been taken. Clearly, measures to restructure the finances of the banks and
the corporate sector had to be included as part of the program,106 and fail-
ure to act on these matters evidently delayed recovery.
The issue then is whether the IMF should lend at all unless these mea-
sures are undertaken. To the extent that Fund conditionality on these issues
increased the likelihood of their implementation or accelerated the rate at
which they were implemented, a strong case can be made for their inclusion;
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105. There is also an issue, not discussed here, that was raised at that time and that supports
the Fund’s actions. That is, there was concern about “contagion” from country to country dur-
ing the crisis. Indeed, there have been two views of the Asian crisis, one focusing on funda-
mentals, and the other on “irrational markets and contagion.” Although it is clear that credi-
tors, when surprised in one situation, look around to ascertain their vulnerability to similar
situations elsewhere, the prevailing view of the Asian crisis seems to have swung more and
more toward fundamentals as more and more evidence emerges as to the weak and weakening
states of the domestic financial systems in the crisis countries in 1996 and 1997.
106. There were conditions such as that calling for the end to the government’s clove mo-
nopoly that, it can be argued, while desirable, were not essential to the program and probably
should not have been imposed on a government whose implementation capacity was in any
event weak. Another condition called for reduced tariﬀs, which was arguably defensible: The
ideal time to reduce import duties is when devaluation is occurring, because it minimizes the
costs to the domestic economy and at the same time cuts the inflationary pressure of the de-
valuation. In Indonesia’s case, an argument can also be made that the country had probably
exhausted its potential for growth through import substitution and that resumption of growth
could not occur at anything like the earlier rates unless such a measure was taken. Careful
reading of the conditions in the LOIs for Indonesia suggests that there were a few, but not very
many, conditions imposed that could not be justified.
an argument against most of these conditions that were essential to finan-
cial restructuring would have to hold either that no loan should have been
forthcoming until the conditions were met prior to the loan or that the
Fund’s imposition of conditions was counterproductive.
The second question—whether Fund support should have continued
when implementation was so slow and so weak—is more diﬃcult. The case
for continued lending is probably best couched in consideration of the al-
ternative: what would have happened, given the state of Indonesian politics,
had the Fund withdrawn its support?107 Given the inability of Indonesia to
attract private capital in any event, it is almost certain that such a move
would have triggered further capital outflows, further weakening the frag-
ile financial system, and reducing real GDP even further. Conjectures as to
what the political responses might have been are well beyond the scope of
this paper, but it seems likely that the political consequences would have
been suﬃciently grave that a decision on more than postponement of a
tranche would almost certainly have required the approval of the major
shareholders in the Fund. As already noted, it is doubtful whether such ap-
proval would have been forthcoming.
As of late 2000, the Indonesian economy had still not achieved a situa-
tion in which growth could resume and normal capital flows could replace
oﬃcial finance. Finding fault with the Fund program, on that account, how-
ever, requires the further step of assuming that there was an alternative pro-
gram that either would have resulted in a diﬀerent political evolution of the
country or would have worked even in the absence of better implementation
on the part of the government. Those believing that the IMF programs were
inappropriate should be asked to specify an alternative scenario: it is not ev-
ident that there is one.
4.1.5 Contrasts between Korea and Indonesia and Other Countries
Thailand’s crisis had a great deal in common with those in Korea and In-
donesia. Thailand had a long history of rapid economic growth based on a
reasonably open economy and export growth at a fixed nominal exchange
rate. However, the financial sector was very weak and deteriorating. In the
mid-1990s, a real estate boom was accompanied by rapid expansion of
bank credit (averaging 37 percent per year from 1992 to 1996), in turn fi-
nanced by capital inflows. Nonperforming loans prior to the crisis are esti-
mated to have been between 17 and 18 percent of all bank loans outstand-
ing. Because many were secured by real estate as collateral, Thailand was
highly vulnerable to any decline in real estate prices. Between 1991 and
IMF Stabilization Programs 343
107. On several occasions, disbursement of later tranches of Fund support were delayed
pending improved implementation. This happened, for example, in April 2000. The Fund staﬀ
obviously had to make a judgment call as to how much action they would insist upon as a con-
dition for additional support.
1996, in addition, the debt-equity ratio of Thailand’s corporate sector had
increased from 170 to 340 percent, which was the second highest among the
crisis countries.
In the case of Thailand, IMF staﬀ were reported to have been urging the
Thai government to alter the exchange rate or the exchange rate regime for
at least a year prior to the crisis. The current account deficit had averaged
over 6 percent of GDP in the 1991–95 period and stood at 7.9 percent of
GDP in 1996. Short-term external debt at the end of 1996 was almost ex-
actly equal to reserves.
When the crisis unfolded, capital outflows from Thailand were a key cul-
prit. Initially, several banks were closed, and immediate action was taken to
begin to restore the financial system. New money associated with the inau-
guration of the IMF program and exchange rate change (with the rate float-
ing) was suﬃcient to stem the capital outflow.108 The Thai government ap-
pears to have followed the fund programs fairly faithfully, and Thailand’s
recovery has been second only to Korea’s among the crisis countries. As in
the other crisis countries, the fiscal stance was loosened as the severity of the
crisis became evident.
An interesting contrast is with that of a noncrisis country: the Philip-
pines. By most measures of the performance of the foreign sector, the
Philippine economy had the most troublesome situation going into the cri-
sis period. The country had had a lower overall rate of economic growth in
the 1990s than any of the crisis countries. Its real exchange rate is estimated
to have appreciated markedly from 1991 to 1995; the current account was
in increasing deficit, reaching 4.7 percent of GDP in 1996 and 5.3 percent
of GDP in 1997. Moreover, the government was incurring small fiscal def-
icits, and public debt was a higher percentage of GDP in 1997 than in any
of the crisis countries.
However, its financial sector appears to have been considerably stronger
than that of the crisis countries. JPMorgan and Goldman Sachs, respec-
tively, estimate actual NPLs in the banking system in 1998 as 5.5 and 3.0
percent of outstanding loans, and the peak after the crisis was proportion-
ately much lower than that of any of the crisis countries. The corporate sec-
tor’s debt-equity ratio was put at 160, somewhat lower than that of the other
crisis countries.
These diﬀerences are striking: the Philippines’ external sector was in
more severe disequilibrium than that of the crisis countries, but its financial
sector was in considerably better shape. The Philippines’ nominal exchange
rate depreciated 32.2 percent. However, the fact that its banking system was
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108. Berg (1999) credits the stemming of capital flight to the Fund program and the fact that
“foreign banks based in Thailand accounted for more than half of Thailand’s private external
debt maturing in 1998. These banks, largely Japanese institutions borrowing from their own
headquarters, were willing to agree to maintain their exposure” (25).
sound permitted it to lower the nominal interest rate in 1998, and real GDP
fell by 0.5 percent—a much smaller magnitude than any of the other crisis
countries.109
Based on other corroborating evidence (the ease of Brazil’s recovery from
the real crisis in the context of a relatively sound banking system) as well,
the conclusion seems inescapable that the negative impact on real GDP and
an economy of a financial crisis combined with an external crisis is much
greater than the sum of the negative impacts of two separate crises: each
feeds upon the other. It also seems evident that restructuring the financial
sector—or at least putting in motion credible policies that will insure the
rapid restructuring—is essential to the resolution of a crisis triggered by
capital outflows. Delay does not appear to ease the negative eﬀects but to
prolong them and perhaps even to intensify them.
The international economy can be, and is being, restructured in ways that
make a crisis, either financial or foreign exchange, less likely. Floating ex-
change rates, altered BIS capital adequacy rules so that short-term debt is
not preferred on the part of lenders, and various steps that have been taken
and are now being contemplated to strengthen financial systems and to re-
dress the imbalances between the attractiveness of short-term lending and
other forms of capital inflow will all contribute.
However, crises there will surely be. Lessons from the Asian crisis will cer-
tainly enable all analysts to appreciate the interactions between financial and
foreign variables and their crucial roles in determining vulnerability for cri-
sis and its aftermath. However, especially in a world in which capital out-
flows can magnify quickly, an institution such as the IMF seems absolutely
essential for ensuring the world’s ability to react in a timely fashion. More-
over, as long as there are weak financial systems negatively aﬀected by ex-
change rate movements or capital outflows, it will continue to be necessary
for the IMF to address financial restructuring as well as exchange rate issues.
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2. Stanley Fischer
Because the discussion at the conference has focused on International
Monetary Fund (IMF)–supported stabilization programs in Asia, I will
start by outlining some of the lessons the IMF has drawn from the programs
in Asia during 1997–98. I will then take up five general issues that arise in
all IMF-supported programs: when to lend; choosing an exchange rate
regime; setting fiscal and monetary policy; determining structural policy
conditions; and how much to lend.
First, let us consider Asia. Jack Boorman and other IMF colleagues have
written a thoughtful paper on IMF-supported programs in Thailand, In-
donesia, and Korea in 1997–98 (Boorman et al. 2000). Among the key con-
clusions are the following:
• First, fiscal policy was too tight at the start of each program, but it was
loosened rapidly (especially in Indonesia and Korea) once the extent of
the economic downturns became clear.
• Second, the bank closures in Indonesia should have been more wide-
ranging (when the sixteen banks were closed, it was known that others
would have to be closed, which reduced confidence in the remaining
banks) and there should have been more comprehensive guarantees for
depositors (deposits in the closed banks were guaranteed up to a level
that provided coverage for small depositors), to help persuade them to
leave their deposits in the banks that remained open.
• Third, the Fund was right to put the focus of structural conditionality
on financial system and corporate debt restructuring, problems that lay
at the heart of the crisis. However, there may well have been too many
structural policy conditions at the margins of the Fund’s areas of cen-
tral competence and interest. In some cases, particularly that of In-
donesia, this conditionality was included to try to improve governance.
• Fourth, our advice on monetary policy was broadly correct. If mone-
tary policy mistakes were made in Indonesia, they were because policy
was too loose, not too tight.
• The programs succeeded when they were implemented resolutely and
consistently. In all three cases, this took a change of government. In-
donesia was a special case. The course of the crisis was tied up with the
uncertainties surrounding the Suharto succession. We believed—and
were assured by important Asians—that the key to restoring market
confidence was to get the president’s public support for the economic
program. However, it seemed that when he did express support for the
program—for policies that were at odds with much of what he had
been doing for decades—the markets simply took this as a signal that
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his time was running out, and they had no idea what would follow his
departure.
Now let me turn to some more general issues.
When to Lend
In an ideal world, the Fund would get involved with a country early in its
diﬃculties, when there is still time to stop the drama turning into a crisis.
However, this is easier said than done. For one thing, the IMF cannot force
a country to have a program. The country has to ask, and then the program
has to have a reasonable chance of success.
It is clear from our Article IV consultations that we were warning
about financial weaknesses in Asia long before the crises came to a head.
In Indonesia, we were approached by technocrats in the government in
August and September 1997 who were well aware of many of the prob-
lems in the banking sector and of what needed to be done to fix them. The
president was not on board, however, and we could not move to a pro-
gram because we had no confidence that the necessary measures would
be carried out.
We are often urged to support a particular policymaker, or group of pol-
icymakers, because they oﬀer the best—sometimes, we are told, the only—
hope of getting a country out of its economic mess. That may well be so, and
in many cases our support makes it more likely that the right things will
happen. However, we have to be realistic. We cannot ask our executive
board to commit the Fund’s resources to support even the best-intentioned
of reformers if the program does not have a reasonable chance of success.
This is a tough call to make. The best programs are those to which the au-
thorities, and ideally the society more widely, are committed—programs
owned by the country. For instance, in the program with Colombia that be-
gan at the end of 1999, we were confident of the ability and commitment of
the Colombian policymakers to the principles and design of the program,
and the political support they had, even though the diﬃcult conditions in
Colombia meant their task would not be easy.
Cases in which the international community is in eﬀect supporting a par-
ticular reformist policy line, which is opposed by important and powerful
domestic factions, are much more diﬃcult. However, if we took a purist ap-
proach and never supported any program in which ownership is less than
complete, then we would not support a significant number of programs that
succeed. In many such cases, this is a risk that the international community
is probably right to take.
Choosing an Exchange Rate Regime
The crises of the last few years demonstrate that countries open to inter-
national capital flows are wise to have either floating exchange rates or, de-
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pending on their histories, hard pegs, by which I mean dollarization, a cur-
rency board, or membership of a currency union.1 Intermediate regimes—
adjustable pegs, crawls, and narrow bands—have generally proven unsus-
tainable.
I do not mean by a floating rate regime one in which monetary policy is
completely indiﬀerent to the level of the exchange rate. Policymakers can in-
fluence the exchange rate through monetary policy actions or occasional in-
tervention. What they should not do is allow the defense of a particular
value for the exchange rate to become the central plank of the country’s eco-
nomic policy, unless that commitment is enshrined in some form of hard
peg.
In accordance with the Articles of Agreement, which leave the choice of
its exchange rate system to each country, the IMF generally avoids being
doctrinaire on the exchange rate regime when deciding whether to support
a country’s program. We have taken diﬀerent approaches in diﬀerent situa-
tions. In Ecuador, early in 2000, we supported dollarization after the event,
even though we would not have recommended it beforehand. In Colombia,
a few months earlier, we did insist on a move to a flexible rate, because the
currency had been pushing against the bottom of its band for some time and
the regime was clearly unsustainable. In Turkey, we supported a crawling
peg to stabilize triple-digit inflation to begin with, but with an exit strategy
to a float built in, a strategy that did not succeed.
If the Fund is convinced—as it was in Colombia—that a given regime is
unsustainable, then it would be irresponsible to support a program that in-
corporates that regime. However, where the outlook is less clear—as it was,
for instance, in the case of the Brazilian peg in October 1998—we have gen-
erally given the country the benefit of the doubt. This has been controver-
sial, for there are always some who are convinced that the currency is over-
valued and should not be defended. In giving the country the benefit of the
doubt, we are deeply aware that we are not the policymakers directly con-
cerned and responsible to the voters in that country, and that responsibility
for a decision on a change in exchange rate or exchange rate regime, which
may have massively adverse consequences, must rest with those who will
carry it out.
Exit from a pegged exchange rate system is always diﬃcult. When the go-
ing is good and the peg is strong, the country sees no reason to change the
system. However, if the peg is under pressure, the policymakers will insist
on defending it, for fear of the consequences of devaluation. And some-
times—for instance, in the case of Jordan, which has defended its peg over
the period since 1996—they do very well this way over sustained periods. In
such cases, the Fund generally tries to persuade the country gradually to al-
low more flexibility in the rate.
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1. This theme is developed in more detail in Fischer (2001).
Setting Fiscal and Monetary Policy
Three interrelated factors help determine the required degree of fiscal ad-
justment: the sources and extent of financing for the budget deficit; the
sources and extent of financing for the balance of payments; and debt dy-
namics. In the Brazilian program formulated in early 1999, after the deval-
uation, the debt dynamics were the critical factor. The debt-GDP ratio was
33 percent at the start of the plan real in 1994; it was 47 percent and rising
in early 1999. The question was: how much fiscal tightening was needed to
turn this trend around, given cautious assumptions on the behavior of real
interest rates?
In Thailand we called initially for fiscal tightening for three reasons: be-
cause the balance-of-payments deficit had been large before the program;
because the implicit liabilities and debt that would be created by financial
restructuring had to be dealt with; and because we believed that would
strengthen market confidence. In Indonesia and Korea, the tightening was
motivated by the last two factors. These were legitimate concerns, although
it soon became clear that policy was initially set too tight, and fiscal policy
was eased.
In setting monetary policy within a program, the concern is to avoid gen-
erating too much inflation. Typically, performance criteria for monetary
policy in IMF programs are set in terms of specific quantitative limits on cer-
tain monetary variables, usually a floor for net international reserves and a
ceiling on net domestic assets of the central bank. There are interesting an-
alytical questions about how best to adapt this time-tested framework to
countries where monetary policy is set in terms of an inflation target. In a
case like that of Brazil, where there is confidence in the people carrying out
the inflation-targeting framework, getting the technicalities right may not be
terribly important. However, there will be other countries where the precise
specification of the monetary policy conditions is much more important.
Determining Structural Policy Conditions
Structural policies rightly come within the purview of IMF-supported
programs when tackling them is essential to solving the country’s macro-
economic problems. The scope and detail required will therefore vary from
country to country. In our 1999 program with Ecuador, for example, priva-
tization was needed not only for eﬃciency reasons but also because the
country needed the privatization revenues to reduce its debt significantly.
Banking-sector problems are often the source of structural conditions. In
some transition economies, restructuring of the energy sector is needed for
both balance of payments and domestic macroeconomic reasons.
The scope and detail of structural policy conditions in IMF programs
has increased in recent years, in part because there is greater recognition
now of the importance of structural policies in creating the conditions for
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macroeconomic stability and strong growth. However, there are also two
major concerns: first, that the Fund has been moving outside its areas of
concentration and expertise; and, second, that demanding too many condi-
tions may be an infringement of national sovereignty that risks undermin-
ing the authorities’ commitment to the program. In response, the Fund is
streamlining structural conditionality.
One of the hardest areas in which to do this is governance. It is an un-
avoidable fact that if the international community wants to help countries
in trouble, then it will be hard to sustain public support for this activity if
people believe that the money we lend ends up in the hands of crooks. So
governance—in the sense of corruption—issues inevitably have to be ad-
dressed.
This is a defensive reason for tackling governance problems. However,
doing so is also good for the country concerned and its citizens (it also hap-
pens, in my view, to be the right thing to do). Indeed, the IMF frequently
finds civil society in borrowing countries strongly supportive of anticor-
ruption measures in IMF programs in their country. How far you go in each
case is a diﬀerent matter. Whether we should have confronted the clove and
plywood monopolies in Indonesia is a reasonable matter for debate. How-
ever, some measures were undoubtedly necessary to begin changing the
ways in which business was being done in Indonesia, if the investment cli-
mate and the basis for investment decisions in Indonesia were to change.
In determining structural policy conditions, we also have to ask how we
can cooperate most eﬀectively with other agencies to deliver the interna-
tional community’s objectives. Many necessary structural reforms are the
primary responsibility of the World Bank, for example, the creation of so-
cial safety nets, or privatizations. Including these elements in a program
helps ensure that they get done, and in the past we often included them at
the request of the World Bank for that reason. We are now examining, with
the World Bank, whether there are better ways of achieving the desired out-
come.
Deciding How Much to Lend
In deciding how much the Fund should lend, it is conceptually important
to distinguish between liquidity and solvency crises—a distinction easier to
make in theory than in practice. Essentially, we need to decide whether a
country’s balance-of-payments position is sustainable in the medium term.
If it is not sustainable, then it will be necessary to restructure its debts. If it
is sustainable, then we might be prepared to lend big sums to help countries
through the crisis. That is the appropriate solution to a liquidity crisis.
Other considerations of course come into play in deciding when “big” be-
comes “too big,” including the perceived risk of moral hazard. These issues
are hard to judge in the abstract and have to be dealt with largely crisis-by-
crisis.
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One clear lesson from the crises in Asia and subsequently is that the days
of smoke-and-mirrors lending are gone. If the international community is
going to promise money, then it had better be there and it had better be seen
to be there. It also needs to be available quickly. These lessons from some of
the Asian programs were applied successfully to the Brazilian program that
began in 1998.
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3. Jeﬀrey D. Sachs
Thanks very much, Marty, and thanks for the opportunity to review this is-
sue yet again. As you might guess, I’m going to take a bit more critical view
of what’s happened. I want to say at the outset that it is not in any way a per-
sonal view of any of the people involved, because there could not have been,
I think, a stronger group with greater integrity than the people that led this.
I’d like to start with one general point, which also follows our discussion
this morning, about the way that our profession discusses the issues that
we’ve been exploring. I thought the discussion was fabulous, but I would
have liked one sentence arching over the discussion, and that is that we can-
not and should not be searching for one solution or one policy prescription
that’s appropriate to everybody and to all circumstances. I think the most
important thing in macroeconomic policy making is to undertake what
doctors call a “diﬀerential diagnosis.” The symptoms of any case can sug-
gest multiple competing explanations and interpretations. The first job is to
understand which of these alternative views applies in a given historical
context. Only then can the correct treatment be prescribed.
Since macroeconomic crises are very nonlinear and path-dependent pro-
cesses, the detailed decisions matter a lot in determining the outcomes over
the course of a couple of years. I should also add that I would have little dis-
agreement with anything the International Monetary Fund (IMF) did in
Asia if we were looking at a horizon of five to ten years. My concern is about
the specifics of IMF management in the heat of the crisis. Over the horizon
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of a few years, we all believe in open markets, currency convertibility, fi-
nancial-sector reform, and fiscal prudence. There are few fundamental is-
sues at stake regarding medium-term macroeconomic management. The
problem, as Keynes famously observed, lies in the short run—when the pa-
tient is very sick, and when a proper diagnosis is essential. The wrong pre-
scription can further weaken, if not kill, the patient.
I think the origins of the Asian crisis are now fairly much accepted, and
I think they could have been fairly well understood back in the middle of
1997. To refresh my mind, I went back to see what I wrote in op-eds and pol-
icy memos even before the crisis got serious in the fall of 1997. The basic
problems—of overvalued currencies pegged to a strong dollar, huge short-
term capital inflows, underregulated banking sectors, and financial vulner-
ability as a result of all of these factors—were all rather apparent.
The real issue was, in my opinion, was how to handle events at three crit-
ical periods. First, during the summer and fall of 1997, the collapse of the
Thai baht pushed the region into a period of high risk. Second, at the very
end of 1997 and early 1998, the region was in fulminant financial panic,
marked by the massive and intense flight of foreign and domestic capital.
Third, as of mid-1998, the region needed to consider the long-term strate-
gies for cleaning up the balance sheets and overcoming the collapse of the
financial system. My quarrels with the IMF mainly involved the first two
time periods.
In the summer and fall of 1997, the entire region got pulled into financial
crisis following the collapse of the pegged exchange rate in Thailand. Was
the crisis inevitable? Specifically, was it inevitable as of mid-1997 that the re-
gion would face a fall in gross national product (GNP) of 5 percent or more
in 1998? I think that the answer is no. The steep downturn could have been
avoided. There was nothing in the “fundamentals” of the productive sectors
of the East Asian economies that warranted a fall in output of 5–10 percent
of GNP in 1998 (especially considering trend growth rates of more than 5
percent per year in most of the region). The steep fall was the result of fi-
nancial panic, and the panic, in my view, could still have been averted in
mid-1997.
We now know, in retrospect, that the collapse of output was the result of
a ferocious outflow of short-term capital from the region. The capital left,
in my opinion, not because of fundamentals, but because of a self-fulfilling
panic. Since short-term debts were so high relative to reserves, panicky
short-term claimants came to believe that they needed to move their money
out of Asia ahead of other short-term creditors, lest they get caught with
illiquid assets when the region’s foreign reserves were depleted (as of course
actually happened to the slow-moving investors). This was a rational view
assuming that others took the same point of view—in other words, a
“rational panic,” in which a nonpanic equilibrium could also have been
achieved.
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If nobody had panicked, the short-term debts could have been rolled
over, as usual. Maturities could have been lengthened to reduce vulnerabil-
ity. The economies were strong enough over the medium term to scale back
their current accounts, and export their way out of debt crisis, with moder-
ate currency depreciations eliminating the preceding overvaluations. In-
stead, however, there was panic, and the banks and the government could
not redeem the short-term loans being pulled. The result was a default on
debt repayments and a ferocious credit squeeze.
In short, the East Asian economies were vulnerable to panic (because of
high short-term debts, overvalued currencies, and weak financial sectors),
but they were not fatally ill. So what pushed the economies from a moder-
ate slowdown into a full-fledged panic? I believe that the panic was due, at
least in some part, to the behavior of the IMF itself. When the baht was de-
valued and other neighboring countries started to face withdrawals of
credit, the IMF began demanding root-and-branch reforms. The rhetoric
from Washington escalated. Suddenly, the Asian economies could do no
right. What had been Asian-style capitalism suddenly turned into Asian-
style cronyism. All this was fine and good, except that the rhetoric was part
of the fuel of the panic itself.
There were three interlocking mistakes, in my mind. The first, and per-
haps the most explosive, was the decision by the IMF, in the middle of a
fragile situation, to force the widespread closure of weak financial institu-
tions in Thailand, Indonesia, and Korea. Again, I don’t think I’d have any
disagreement on a three-year or five-year horizon with tightening up on fi-
nancial standards, and even closing many banks, but this is a crucial matter
of timing. Wisdom led the U.S. bank regulators not to close the major U.S.
commercial banks in the middle and late 1980s when the banks had very
weak balance sheets (following the Latin American debt crisis), or even to
close Long-Term Capital Management in 1998, for fear of a major credit
crunch. Yet the IMF pushed hard for massive bank closures in Asia, and
this helped to instigate panic, in my opinion.
In Indonesia, which was the place I was following most closely, one eco-
nomic advisory group, and I don’t vouch for them, wrote on 28 October, two
days before the bank closures, “Forcing problematic banks to liquidate in
the midst of the ongoing monetary crisis would further deteriorate confi-
dence in the monetary sector, and could spark a run on the banks. The gov-
ernment should not act hastily in forcing problem banks to liquidate. It’s
likely bank liquidation would be done discriminately with banks owned by
politically well-connected business people escaping the ax. Such bias would
cause uncertainty among people and might worsen the public’s confidence
in the banking industry. This would in turn start a massive bank run, where
customers would move their funds to foreign banks.” Regulatory forbear-
ance makes a lot of sense when you’re in such an explosive environment.
Second, I felt that the IMF was trying to prove its strength by stressing
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how much the Asian economies needed fundamental reforms. The IMF be-
gan to lecture the Asian economies incessantly about all that was wrong
with crony capitalism. Deep and rapid reforms, it was argued, would restore
confidence. However, this approach did the opposite, making investors feel
that the sky was falling, when all that was needed was a modest 20 percent
depreciation of formerly pegged exchange rates.
Third, I thought that the way that the packages were put together at the
beginning added to the likelihood of panic (and said so repeatedly at the
time, for whatever it’s worth). The notion that raising interest rates sharply
in this context, squeezing credit, closing banks, and cutting budgetary
spending sharply would raise confidence rather than lowering confidence
was something that I found profoundly doubtful. When the packages were
introduced, they certainly did not stop the panic. This is important to un-
derstand because, again, we’re not debating views on fundamentals, or
whether Suharto was a creep or whether his son was a crook or anything like
that. We’re debating clinical approaches to an incipient (but still avoidable,
perhaps) financial panic. When the packages were introduced, the curren-
cies continued to slide, the bank run developed in Indonesia in November,
and the Korean package failed to stop the flight of creditors from Korean
banks in December.
The result is, in my view, a macro collapse in 1998 that was much deeper
than was justified by the real economy. Moreover, I saw in many countries
that the fall of output was the result of the ferocious liquidity squeeze that
marked the financial panic. In Indonesia, for example, the shoe manufac-
turers’ association came to see the government in January 1998 to complain
that the industry had confirmed international orders for around $500 mil-
lion of shoe exports, but no working capital to buy the inputs needed for
highly profitable exports! Thus, even in the context of an incredibly weak
currency, exports were falling, not rising, because of the intensity of the fi-
nancial squeeze. This is a powerful sign (among many such signs) that out-
put fell far more than was justified by fundamental factors.
The credit squeeze might not have been fully avoidable (i.e., the panic
may indeed have been unstoppable in late 1997, despite my belief that in-
deed it could have been avoided), but it surely did not have to be met with
massive budget cutting and interest rate increases. There is the problem of
the second time horizon that I mentioned at the start of my remarks, the pe-
riod from the very end of 1997 to early 1998, when the panic was already
fulminant. In this period, the IMF really piled on, demanding massive
structural reforms while also advocating fierce fiscal austerity in the midst
of a massive credit squeeze.
The IMF fiscal and monetary package certainly didn’t ease the crisis.
What really stopped the fierce downturn was the end of the short-term cap-
ital outflows. This occurred throughout Asia in late 1997 and until mid-
1998 for three reasons: some debts were finally rescheduled or rolled over
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(as in Korea just after Christmas); central banks ran out of reserves, lead-
ing to defaults by domestic banks and companies to foreign creditors; and,
third, many of the short-term loans were simply repaid.
Is all well that ends well? After all, the economies have recovered. Our
judgment on how things went depends on the standards that we use. I think
that there has been a tremendous amount of unnecessary suﬀering and eco-
nomic loss. The legacy of the financial panic will last for years, because gov-
ernments took on enormous debt in order to bail out the collapsed financial
sectors.
Final notes. First, prevention is essential. In the precrisis moment, when
a spark can set oﬀ a conflagration, forbearance and subtlety, not shouting,
are all really good pieces of policy wisdom. In the crisis itself, it’s crucial not
to overload macroeconomic austerity, not to exacerbate panic, and to un-
derstand panic as a real phenomenon, not just as a turn of phrase, but as an
actual event in capital markets that squeezes real output from the supply
side, not the demand side. Forcing rollovers or standstills on debt repay-
ments should be a core part of how we handle these episodes. Finally, we
had U.S. senators pressing the IMF to make sure that the Korean deal with
the IMF included market-opening clauses or other specific trade measures
reflecting U.S. interests rather than Korea’s macroeconomic needs. We have
to figure out ways to keep the IMF a truly international institution, and not
a creditor institution of the major shareholders. Thanks.
Discussion Summary
Guillermo Ortiz complained about the publicity that sometimes surrounds
IMF missions to crisis-aﬄicted countries. After the Mexican crisis, no one
knew when an IMF oﬃcial was in the country, he said, adding that this was
very helpful. Responding to Jeﬀrey Sachs’s comment on the need for clini-
cal analysis of each crisis, Ortiz expressed doubt about the likely success of
ex post counterfactual analysis of alternative policy responses. As an ex-
ample, he recalled that interest rates rose to 80 percent in February and
March of 1995. “Would 40 percent have been enough?” he asked, answer-
ing, “I really don’t know.” He said you have to overshoot in your policy re-
sponse in the midst of a crisis, avoiding the greater danger of falling short
and not reestablishing confidence.
Morris Goldstein said that an important diﬀerence between Asia and
Brazil was the extent of currency mismatches—liabilities denominated in
foreign currencies and assets denominated in domestic currency—on the
balance sheets of banks and corporations. The devaluation in Brazil was
not associated with large-scale bankruptcies. He noted various ways to
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limit the mismatch problem: moving to a floating rate (counting on cur-
rency movements to make people aware of exchange rate risk); putting a
spotlight on the extent of the mismatches so that the market demands a pre-
mium for lending where such mismatches exist; and dollarization. On the
question of whether large recessions could have been avoided if a diﬀerent
policy course had been followed, Goldstein thinks the answer is “No.” If the
IMF had come out and said that it was really just a liquidity crisis and there
was nothing to worry about, the markets would not have been reassured,
given the bad news that was coming out each day about the state of the fi-
nancial systems. Lowering interest rates worked in Australia, Sweden, and
the United Kingdom—but they are not emerging markets, he said.
Peter Garber commented on the use of the word “panic.” What we saw
was a kind of “cold panic” that followed from the way risk is managed in in-
dustrial-country banking systems, he said. Value-at-risk methods push al-
most automatic reductions in positions as returns become more correlated
in a crisis. Managers are faced with the option of increasing the capital held
against positions in emerging markets or reducing those positions. The po-
sitions are often unwound. He dislikes the word “panic” in this context be-
cause it suggests that two outcomes can occur, with psychology determin-
ing which one prevails. It is not psychology, he said, but the result of the way
risk is managed.
Paul Keating highlighted how the ending of the cold war led to a major
shift in the importance attached by the industrial countries to Indonesia.
One implication of its fall from importance was that debt standstills were
not tried and, indeed, were strongly objected to. The ultimate result was a
dramatic shift in capital flows. Regarding what was needed to maintain
Suharto’s support for reforms, he said support was lost as the list of de-
mands for structural reforms grew, and he blamed the IMF for saying things
that undermined investor confidence in Indonesia. Stanley Fischer strongly
objected to this characterization of the IMF’s role, which he said reflected a
common misperception in Australia. Keating went on to describe the huge
political and economic diﬃculties that Indonesia now confronts and called
for some humility on the question of how appropriate the international re-
sponse to the crisis was. He said that Indonesia had a liquidity and credit
crunch, adding that “countries that didn’t get the IMF in, like Malaysia, did
better, and this point has not gone unnoticed.” Returning to the geopoliti-
cal significance of Indonesia, he said that the Asia Pacific Economic Coop-
eration (APEC) would not have been possible without Suharto and his gov-
ernment. And Keating doubts that China would be joining the World Trade
Organization (WTO) if APEC did not exist. He closed by urging the IMF
to focus on its core mission of dealing with balance-of-payments disequi-
libria—“standing up to the United States Treasury or whoever,” if neces-
sary.
Charles Dallara said that it is important to recognize that the IMF, like
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everyone else, was scrambling to understand the transmission mechanisms
in the unfolding crisis. Mistakes were made, but these mistakes are related
to the complexity of the underlying mechanisms. On the question of the
Fund’s fiscal emphasis, he agrees that too much stress was placed on cor-
recting fiscal problems. But, again, the path to restoring confidence was un-
clear. He added that at this time of “noncrisis” he is actually more worried
that the Fund is not putting enough emphasis on fundamental fiscal re-
form, such as establishing rational, broadly based tax systems.
On the question of corruption and governance, Dallara said the Fund’s
shareholders would not tolerate putting money into countries where there
is a high probability of misappropriation. He added that the fund needs
more help in grappling with governance issues, taking into account its lack
of staﬀ expertise in such areas as corporate governance. If the Fund is to
avoid mission creep, he said that it is essential that the World Bank take on
a larger role in these areas, adding that if the World Bank “continues to ad-
dress the diagnosis and development of programs for structural reform at
the pace it does today, and the pace it has for all the years I’ve known it, the
Fund has little choice but to scramble to try to cope with these issues itself.”
If the Fund’s shareholders want to avoid mission creep, “they have to de-
velop a much more activist, fast-paced organization in the World Bank.”
Nouriel Roubini commented on a number of issues in Jeﬀrey Sachs’s pres-
entation. First, he said that while most people agree that the initial fiscal
policies were too tight, two caveats needed to be kept in mind: some coun-
tries (notably Russia and Brazil) did have serious fiscal problems, and the fi-
nancial-sector bailouts had major fiscal implications. Second, he said that
he does not agree that an easier monetary policy would have helped. Given
the large amount of foreign debt on the balance sheets, and given the fact
that a lower interest rate would have led to further devaluation, the balance
sheet eﬀects of a looser monetary policy “would have been disastrous.” As
evidence, he compared Indonesia, which he said pumped in huge amounts
of liquidity to support the banking system, to Korea and Thailand, which
followed a more restrictive monetary course. Third, he questioned the wis-
dom of substantial “forbearance” when dealing with the banks. In many
cases—finance companies in Thailand, merchant banks in Korea, and so
on—the institutions were insolvent rather than illiquid. This raised the tra-
ditional problem of the institutions’ “gambling for redemption.” Roubini
added that the eventual costs are greater if you don’t intervene. To avoid
panic, care must be taken in closing down institutions—for example, put-
ting in place appropriate deposit insurance—but forbearance is not a solu-
tion. Fourth, Roubini said he disagrees with those who claim that there
weren’t significant problems in the real economies of the Asian countries
prior to the crises. In Korea, for example, seven out of the top thirty chae-
bol were already formally bankrupt in the middle of 1997. Finally, on the
question of how to stem the outflow of capital, he expressed skepticism
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about the wisdom of debt standstills. He pointed to various unintended
consequences: a “rush for the exit” when standstills are anticipated; the risk
of contagion as investors fear standstills in other countries; movement
down the slippery slope to exchange and capital controls; inducement to as-
set stripping; and costly litigation.
Larry Summers sought to correct what Jeﬀrey Sachs said about guaran-
teeing bank liabilities in Korea. He said the Korean government had given
a guarantee to cover most of the liabilities during the summer of 1997 and
believed it was important to stand by that guarantee. Although one can dis-
agree about the wisdom of such a guarantee, the international community
had supported the Korean government’s eﬀorts. The support was not the
“craven kowtowing to international capital that Jeﬀ suggests,” he said.
Summers then asked two questions.
First, was the international community right in forcing Thailand to dis-
close its true net reserve position in the summer of 1997 (when it had sub-
stantial forward positions that eﬀectively depleted its foreign reserves)?
Jeﬀrey Sachs thinks it probably was a mistake, pointing out that the markets
misunderstood the disclosure. People thought $30 billion had been lost, in-
stead of market losses on contracts worth $30 billion. Fischer said there was
never going to be a good day to make the disclosure. “There was no good
time; it was done at the least bad time,” he said. On how it was presented, he
thinks it might have been possible to explain it better, but they tried hard to
show people the cash flow projections and to emphasize that they were not
going to lose $30 billion.
Second, Summers asked those who dislike what the Fund did in Indone-
sia if it should employ more or less people who think about political and
governance issues. More people would allow the Fund to be more sensitive
to the nuances of the situation. Fewer people would make them less in-
volved in the set of issues that surround governance, and thus less involved
in structural issues. Sachs said that adding more political experts is not de-
sirable for the world system, given its present lack of legitimacy. He said he
would rather see the institution depoliticize to become the foremost crisis
prevention and crisis management tool for financial markets.
Edwin Truman said that Jeﬀrey Sachs’s prescription, which he sees as
amounting to massive forbearance, creates moral hazard on the debtors’ side.
He then raised the question of how vocal the IMF should be, recounting that
he used to be of the view that the IMF should go quietly into a country. How-
ever, he does not think that is realistic today, now that the IMF has to explain
what it is doing. He added that the IMF had used all its leverage with Thai-
land in advance of the crisis but was largely ignored. Indeed, Thailand de-
valued without going to the Fund for a program—which he dubbed the
“Mexican solution” (in 1994)—which put the Fund in a diﬃcult situation.
He concluded by saying that Fund oﬃcials “should be judicious, but the no-
tion that they should be absolutely quiet seems to me to be just unrealistic.”
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Anne O. Krueger recounted meetings with Korean technocrats in August
1997, when everyone had used the words “impending crisis.” She said they
all talked about the interconnections between the chaebol financing, the
state of the banks, the exchange rate, and capital flows. There was no con-
fusion about what the problems were, and there was a consensus that gov-
ernment would not act until forced to by a crisis. On Sachs’s attempt to sep-
arate short-term issues from medium- and long-term issues, she said that,
given the insolvency of the chaebol, dealing with the situation as if it were
just a liquidity crisis would just postpone the crisis. Moving on to the cur-
rent situations in the financial systems of crisis-aﬀected countries (as of Oc-
tober 2000), Krueger said that the situation in Indonesia is very bad. The
banking system is in bad shape because banks are holding nonnegotiable
government bonds in the place of nonperforming loans. The problem with
nonnegotiable bonds is that you can’t lend them, so that there is no domes-
tic credit, she said. Turning to Korea, she said that all is not well there ei-
ther, with financial restructuring only half completed. She thinks Korea has
gone too fast with its recovery without addressing fundamental weaknesses
and would have been better oﬀ with a slower recovery that didn’t leave an-
other crisis looming for the future.
Responding to Krueger on the issue of timing, Sachs said that he was not
making a distinction between what to do now and what to do ten years from
now, but between now and three months or six months. Closing or sus-
pending fourteen banks in Korea in December 1997, or closing sixteen In-
donesian banks in the middle of an incipient run, is a gamble that does not
make sense, he said. Responding to Nouriel Roubini’s earlier observation
about liquidity injections in Indonesia, Sachs said that it was not because
the government was attempting to pump-prime the economy. They were re-
sponding to massive runs by depositors, and they had to decide whether to
formally suspend the banking system—as was done in the United States in
1933—or to provide liquidity.
Sachs said that Morris Goldstein might be right when he says the down-
turn was unavoidable, but he pointed out that no one was predicting at the
time that the downturn was going to be –8 percent. Observing the contrac-
tionary policies that were being pursued, he said he believed at the time that
the downturn would be very severe. He agreed that he is essentially calling
for forbearance, but “not for years.” Instead, he believes that you must pur-
sue the policy course that does most to avoid a panic. Moreover, he said if
Peter Garber is right, and it wasn’t panic but rather the working of the
value-at-risk models of the international commercial banks, then the situa-
tion is even worse, and suspensions of flows or other mechanisms for direct
intervention become absolutely essential.
Remarking on the financial problems of the Korean chaebol, Sachs said
that it is one thing for these groups to be going bankrupt, but it is something
else for the economy to shrink by 7 percent. He said the financial and real
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sides are diﬀerent for all sorts of reasons, and this explains why Korea was
able to bounce back sharply, utilizing its capacity in some of the most im-
portant industries (e.g., semiconductors) in the world.
Fischer said he has little time for the charge that the IMF could have
stemmed the capital outflows if it had expressed more confidence. He said
he is more struck by the charge that the IMF “was asleep at the switch” and,
with the possible exception of Thailand, never did get around to telling
people that a disaster was coming. He thinks the Fund was late in Korea
and missed some of the signals. However, he pointed out that the Koreans
were hiding some of their reserves data. So, if anything, the Fund needs to
answer to the charge that it was overly optimistic in its projections, not that
it helped spread the panic.
On the issue of whether the output collapse could have been smaller, he
said that an easier fiscal policy would have helped, but not substantially so.
He also pointed out that the Mexican rescue went badly until there was a
fiscal tightening. At the time, people criticized the IMF for not recognizing
the contractionary impact of a tighter fiscal stance. However, there had to
be a judgment on the relative sizes of Keynesian impact and the confidence
impact, assuming these went in opposite directions. On dealing with the
banking sector, he doesn’t think forbearance is the right solution. A better
solution would have been comprehensive guarantees, as happened in Thai-
land. It was important to get on with restructuring the banks as quickly as
possible. The alternative model is Japan, which is what you get with very
long forbearance, he said.
Regarding what was needed to restore confidence in Indonesia, Fischer
said that no one was going to believe you were doing anything to solve the
country’s problems, unless you were seen to be doing something to solve the
problems with the banks.
Finally, on the issue of IMF accountability, he noted that the heads of
governments of leading industrial nations were closely involved in the In-
donesian program, with many heads of government calling on Suharto to
urge him to pursue the reforms. He stressed that IMF technocrats should
not be making decisions that are at their core “political judgments,” and he
added that he feels immensely reassured that the Fund has to take its pro-
grams before its board and listen to what 182 governments think. It is es-
sential that member governments support decisions. It is the IMF’s job to
get the technical side right, but “we cannot pretend that the technical things
we do are purely technical and do not have political consequences,” he said.
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